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Section A: CONTEXT 
I. This section first describes the legal order in relation to problems of 
governance and development; and explains why this Project Document recommends 
that the UMDP focus on the courts and the legislative drafting process as strategic 
/ 
entry points for strengthening the legal order. The section then outlines the host 
country strategy for imporiving the legal order; the status of prior and on-going 
assistance to that sector; and the legal order's institutional framework. 
I. Description of the subsector: 
1 
"The constitution of Nepal outlines the basic economic rights of the citizen but the irony is 
that state can't provide it. Although there is no discrimination on eco '.1omic rights of citizen, the 
extent of poverty and prevailing inequality are alarming . Concerning the poverty, over 2/3 of the 
population live bel0w the poverty line and the women and children are influenced most by the 
incidence of poveri:y. It is estimate that food consumption of over sixty percent population are 
below minimum daily calorie requirement. .. [I]mpressionistic view suggests that the majority of the 
papulation do not haver basic clothes to protect them against nature. . . . By any standards, health 
status in Nepal is very disappointing. In spite of government efforts for the past four decades, the 
formal health system is not accessible to the majority of the people. Only 15 to 20% of the people 
have access to the formal health sector. All major health indicators , life expectancy , infant 
mortality , maternal mortality are very disappointing. As compared to other South Asian countries , 
the life expectancy of 53 is the lowest while infant mortality is the highe st." I 
Shrestha , S . gdel and Tarak , ' Government Assessment (Nepal) ," [Nepal 
Administrative Staff College , Management Guidance Department , 1998) J p. 52. The 
Ri sing Nepal of Marc h 11, 1999, reported that , f r om 1981 to 1998 , the avai l ability 
of food grains per ,)erson per year had faallen from 277 kilograms to 178 ; 
agric ul tural output h ,1d fallen 23 percent , and the proport io n of the population 
below the poverty li r, 2 had increased to 49 percent . (L .B. ~arki & L. Sherchand , 
"P ocket Package Progra nrne for Import Substitution ." ) 
II. Nepal's Constitution explicitly requires the State to " ... adopt a policy aimed at 
the upliftment of the standard of living of the general public .... "2 That standard of 
'living remains one of the world's lowest. The general publ ic expects the state to 
conform to the Constitutional command ; if it does not, democracy itself may lie at 
risk.3 What does the legal order have to do with the 'uplift~ ~nt of the standard of 
living of the general public'? 
III. The contrast between Nepal's poverty and the Constitution's command 
epitomizes the paradox that pervades Nepal's legal framework: The contradictions 
between paper promise and performance , between law and practice, between law-
in-the-books and law-in-action , between reach and grasp . The courts rest on grand 
Constitutional foundations , but in practice grind so slowly that in their lethargy they 
deny justice , shot on practically all levels with corruption; the Conbstitution assigns 
to the Commission on Investigations of the Abuse of Author ity (CIAA) the power 
and duty to investigate corruption , but CIAA has apparently had little impact in 
reducing it; many laws prescribe extensive programs for economic development , but 
annual real growth has averaged only a paltry four percent -- and, in per capita 
annual growth , half that. 
IV. This Part rests on existing, extensive studies by Nepalese and foreign 
2 Constitution , Art. 26( 1) . 
3 Internati o nal Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Assessment 
Mission Rep o rt : " Consolidating Democracy in Nepal ," (St o8 kho l m : International 
Institute for Democracy and Elect o ral Assistance , 1997) p. 3 ( "I n a country where 
the per capita income is bel ow $US 200 , people expect th e politica l system to 
contribute to economi c development and alleviation of poverty . Signs of extreme 
response to the situ at ion both from the Left in the form of a growing terrorist 
movement and from the Right in the form o f a revival of interest in an executive 
monarchy are emerging. If Nepal is t o consolidate democracy , those elected in a 
democratic system must not appear as a hindrance to the development process ." ) 
experts,4 as well as interviews with leading Nepalese in the judiciary and law-
making processes, 5 concerning the nature and scope of that pervasive paradox and 
the problems that it imposes on the legal order. This Part first relates the legal 
order to Nepal's efforts to lift itself out of poverty . Preliminarily, it describes the 
concepts of 'development' and 'good governance'. 
a. In general: 
a. Law-making and implementation 
V. Nepal's Constitution commands government to adopt policies looking 
towards development. Over time , the world around, experience has changed that 
concept from one of merely increasing the nation's GDP to the notion of 
sustainable human development. That phrase has been defined to mean "the 
enlargement of people's choices and capabilities through the formation of social 
capital so as to meet as equitably as possible the needs of current generations 
without compromising the needs of future ones. "6 In every country, a main part of 
the burden of creating the enabling conditions for sustainable human development 
falls on deliberate governmental action. For development to come to pass, that 
governmnetal action must prove effective , and it must result from non-arbitrary 
governmental decision-making -- that is, good governance. That implies a set of 
governmental institutions that effectively bring about changes favorable to the 
majority, and that do so through decisions made pursuant to ~ules and by 
4 See Annex I f o r the documents reviewed for this study. 
5 See Annex II for the persons inter v iewed. 
6 UNDP, Sustainable Human Deve l opment -- From Concept t o 
Operation: A Guid e for the Practit ione r (New York, 1 994 ). 
accountable , transparent , and participatory processes. 
VI. Development and good &_overnance hunt together. Long social experience 
teaches that in development, not to speak of government generally, non-arbitrary 
decision-making produces better results for the population as a whole. That same 
experience teaches that without development , social stability lies at risk , and 
instability wars with good governance. That throughout most of third and 
transitional countries -- as in Nepal -- good governance and sustainable human 
development alike have proven difficult to attain reflects, in large part, deep-
rooted weaknesses in those countries' legal orders. 
VII. Governments' primary tool for creating an enabling development 
environment consists of the use of state power and law to transform existing 
institutions. Resources do not allocate themselves. Groups of people , acting in 
and through institutions allocate them. Nepal's poverty result s from the way its 
institutions now allocate resources to perpetuate poverty and vulnerability . 
VIII. That implies that sustainable human development requires transformations 
in social behaviors. Countries and their different levels of wealth and income 
differ as their institut ions differ. The United States differs from Nepal in their 
banks, their schools , their courts , their family structures, their prisons , farms , 
social clubs , legislatu res, industries, welfare systems -- in short , everything that 
constitutes their political , social and economic systems. Banks , schools, courts, 
families, prisons, farms , social clubs, legislatures , industries , welfare systems: 
These all constitute institutions. To say that countries differ says that their 
political, social and economic systems differ -- that is to say, their institutions 
differ. An institution consists of repetitive patterns of behavior. Development 
_, 
necessitates transformatory changes in the repetitive patterns of behaviours that 
together constitute a society's institutions. 
IX. How does that development task involve the legal order and the laws 
themselves? Everywhere governments restate as rules their seriously intended, 
publicly avowed poli cies: Wherever one looks in government, one sees rules. A 
government programme that government publicly and seriously proposes to 
undertake takes sooner or later the form of rules promulgated by state officials: 
Statutes, subsidiary legislation, administrative regulations , ordinances , bylaws, 
departmental orders, decrees of a military junta , even unwritten constitutional 
conventions. That is, they appear as laws. 
"In all contemporary societies salient elements of state policy have to 
be formulated in terms of law .... The involvement of law in development 
planning and practice is no coincidence; neither is it a matter of conscious 
choice. Development.. .implies change. In as much as government agencies 
engage in development planning and implementation, they aim at changing 
behaviour. In other words , they try to exercise power .... [S]tate law is the 
primary source of legitimation for the exercise of power by or in the name 
f . 117 o state agencies .... 
X. In what sense does a law 'cause' changed behaviours and therefore changed 
institutions? No conceivable magic could endow mere words on paper with so 
powerful a function. Nevertheless , Government generally expresses policy in 
written laws. It does so for two reasons: First , its need for rules to channel the 
manifold behaviours that constitute a society and its institutions , especially its 
government; and , second , the legitimacy that the legal order embodies. 
7 Franz von Benda - Beckmann, " Scapegoat and Magic Charm : Law in 
Development Theory an d Practice ," 28 J . LEGAL PLURALISM 129 ( 1 98':l) 
XI. First , in Nepal , as elsewhere , government expresses policy in the form of 
rules because a handful of policy-makers -- 26 Ministers, 265 Members of 
Parliament , a few very senior public officials -- have the task of ruling the 
country. They must channel in desired ways the behaviours of thousands of public 
employees (in Nepal , some 3 70,0008) and the citizenry at large. (How the 
citizenry controls the behavior of that handful of rulers constitutes half of 
democracy's principal problem not only in Nepal but everywhere -- the other half 
of that problem consists of ensuring that officials comply strictly with the rules 
that purport to define their behaviors.). In Nepal , that tiny handful of legislators , 
Ministers and very senior officials decide whose and what behaviours must 
change in order to achieve sustaionable human development. 
XII. Rules describe and prescribe repetitive patterns of behaviour. Drivers in 
some countries drive on the left. In one sense, that statement constitutes a 
descriptive rule; in those countries , drivers do generally drive on the left. In 
another sense , that same statement constitutes a prescriptive rule: Drivers ought to 
drive on the left. A descriptive rule states what people actually do; a prescriptive 
rule , what they ought to do. To bring about changes in repetitive patterns of 
social behaviours , Nepal's government can only prescribe the desired behaviours, 
and prescribe official behaviours in ways likely to ensure that the prescriptive 
proposition also becomes a descriptive one. In that way, a relatively small group 
of elected and appoin ted Nepalese officials seek to change a multitude of 
behaviours. Government without rules could work only in a society so small that 
it needs neither state nor government. 
8 Shrestha et a j , supra n 1 , p . 100 
XIII. Second, that those rules appear not merely as 'policy' or prescriptions 
expressed in speeches and policy papers, but as laws, does not happen by chance. 
As in most countries at most times, in Nepal neither the governed nor officials 
feel compelled to comply with mere policy -- that is, until expressed as law, mere 
policy lacks legitimacy. Unless officials accept government's directions as 
legitimate, ones which they must obey, government has no means of controlling 
the behaviors of its employees; and unless it can control at least those officials' 
behaviours, government cannot rule. Nor can rule for long if it lacks legitimacy 
with the population at large; government cannot long endure if it can induce 
obedience to its commands only through threat of imprisonment or fine. Nepal's 
government casts its development polices into rules because it through them it 
seeks to prescribe behaviors for officials and citizens; it casts them as laws 
because otherwise not even officials will likely obey them. Inevitably, laws 
become inevitably the operative form of development policies ., 
XIV. In every state, government uses law to perform many jobs: It allocates rights 
and duties, it authoritatively states the values that the rulers believe do, or ought to 
constitute the principal values of the society, it provides forums for dispute 
settlement, symbolically it states what counts (and who counts) in society. In the 
development process , government uses law primarily to channel behaviours into 
new paths. 
XV. To initiate behavioral changes, Nepal's government -- like others -- adopts 
a policy. To move from policy to actual changed behaviors and therefore changed 
institutions, Nepal's government translates those policies into laws, that is, rules 
promulgated by the state. A law thus comprises an essential step for government 
to facilitate development. Laws, however, exist in better and worse forms; 
governments use them more or less effectively to foster the development process. 
(2) Implementation as an integral part of the law. 
XVI. Law becomes the operative face of policy. Nepal's paradox between the 
law-in-the-books and the law-in-action epitomizes a world-wide phenomenon 
frequently expressed in a common complaint: 'We have good laws, but they are 
badly implemented.' For two reasons, that phrase constitutes a contradiction in 
terms. First, a law affects behavior by addressing not one bu at least two sets of 
addressees (see Fig. 1). One, the primary role occupant,9 constitutes the set of 
persons whose behaviors the lawmakers primarily aim to change -- citizens (for 
example, factory owners whom the law forbids throwing industrial waste into 
rivers or streams), or officials (for example, rules of court procedure addressed to 
the High Court judges). A law's second set of addressees comprises the 
government officials charged with implementing the rules directed to the primary 
addressees ( for example, an environmental protection agent ""ho enforces the law 
prohibiting a factory owner from polluting rivers and stream , or the Supreme 
Court judges, who by means of the court's appellate jurisdiction implements the 
rules of procedure addressed to lower courts). 
Figure 1: MODEL OF FACTORS PEOPLE'S BEHAVIOR 
Sociologists de Dote as a ro l e occupant one addressed by a norm , for examp l e , 
as a parent , a worker , a factory owner , an official. 
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XVII. Each of these two sets of rules -- one aimed at the primary role 
occupant, the other at the implementing agency -- aims to induce the behaviors it 
prescribes. Of course, in behaving in the face of those rules, the addressees take 
into account not only the rules themselves, but also the non-legal constraints and 
resources in their environment. In deciding whether or not to obey the anti-
polluting law, factory owners take into account not only the law that forbids them 
from polluting the adjacent river, but also a host of non-legal constraints and 
resources: the costs of disposing of wastes elsewhere; the technology available to 
dispose of them otherwise than in the river; their knowledge of the law's 
commands; their values and attitudes towards preserving the environment. 
Factory owners likely also take into account the environmental agency's expected 
behavior in enforcing the law (how likely will the agency catch them in the act? 
What penalty might the agency actually impose for the violation?). The 
environmental protec tion agents in turn will take into account not only the law 
addressed to them, but also relevant non-legal factors, for exa!Ilple, the number of 
agents available; their technical capacities; the transport they have to take them to 
the factory sites; their knowledge of the law; their fear that their department head 
may sack them if they do not enforce the law properly; their attitudes as to the 
relative importance of profits and pollution; their opportunities to receive, and 
their receptiveness to , a factory owner's offer of a bribe. The drafters have not 
drafted a 'good' law, i ~. in light of all these non-legal factor s, they have failed to 
calculate the behaviors the new law would likely induce in bo h the primary 
addressee (here, factory owners) and the implementing agency (here, the 
environmental protection agent); and if they did not include in the law detailed 
measures likely to affect those factors. 
XVIII. Second, the sentence, 'it is a good law but badly implemented' 
constitutes an oxymoron because, even more than ordinary citizens, government 
implementing agencies -- ministries, departments, courts, police, sheriffs, 
government corporati•)ns, and local government employees -- act within a cage of 
laws. About 90% of the corpus of a modem jurisdiction's statutes and regulations 
consists of rules addressed not to ordinary citizens, but to officials. A law aims to 
induce its prescribed behaviors; by definition, a 'good' law succeeds in inducing 
the behaviors prescribed. How can one caq a law 'good' if it fails to induce the 
official behaviors required to implement it? 
(3) Summary 
XIX. The overriding social problem in Nepal consists of poverty and 
.,. 
vulnerability. To soh ·e it, government cannot merely comma11d resources to 
change their allocatio ns. It must change the institutions -- the repetitive behaviors 
-- that today tend to misallocate resources. The law constitut es government's 
principal instrument for inducing desired change. To induce change, however, 
requires that laws work -- i.e., that they induce the behaviors they prescribe. The 
paradox between high-sounding, well-intrentioned laws that do not produce their 
prescribed behaviors: That constitutes the central probloem of both the Nepalese 
legal order and of Nepalese development. That constitutes a paradigmatic case of 
insufficient governance. 
XX. 'Good governance' includes as a core element the notion of effective 
governance. A 'good ' law badly implemented advertises its own ineffectiveness, 
and therefore its exemplification poor governance. To describe Nepal's 'paradox 
between law and practice describes paradigmactic poor governance. A major 
exmplanation for Nepal's poverty lies not in its economic or other substantive 
policies, but in its governance. What can UNDP do to help Nepalese discover 
ways to achieve good governance? 
b. Two leveraged entry points : Courts and the bill-creation process 
XXI. This section explains why, out of the legal order's vast compass, this 
Proposal centers attention on building capacity in the courts and in the bill 
creating system. A complex institutional system , the legal order consists of the 
rules of law, the rules' primary addressees , law-making institutions of all sorts 
(Parliament, appellate courts in their common law function of filling in the 
interstices of the rules, ministries in their regulation-making functions, local and 
District rule making bodies and officials, and so forth), and implementing 
agencies (ministries, departments, village and district development committees, 
police, government corporations, and many others, including of course, the 
courts). Out of this multitude of institutions that together comprise the legal order, 
most programs concerned with the legal order focus entirely on the courts. This 
section explains why in Nepal the courts deserve considerable, but not exclusive 
attention. A second essential and complementary entry point comprises the 
system of drafting legislation which today seems plagued by the pervasive 
paradox of high-sounding laws and ineffective implementati n. To explain the 
advantages of a governance strategy focused on both, this section first explains the 
institutional limitations on courts' role in development; and then reviews the 
existing system of drafting bills to underscore the importance of improving 
Nepalese capacity to formulate and implement laws designed to create an 
development-enabling environment. 
( 1) The courts 
XXII. What special role do courts play in development and good 
governance that seems to merit the proposed focus as one of two key entry points? 
In Nepal as elsewhere , the judicial system basically peforms three different 
functions: ( 1) settling disputes in general; (2) implementing commercial laws by 
settling businesspersons' disputes; and (3) enforcing rules that limit official power 
and discretion -- that is, helping to maintain good governance. This section 
briefly assesses these court functions in terms of their implications for a UNDP 
strategy for strengthening Nepal's legal order. 
XXIII. The courts' primordial function consists in dispute settlement. For 
historical reasons, English-style courts (like the constitutiona lly-defined courts of 
Nepal, that is, the District, Appellate and Supreme Courts) have a number of 
institutional limitations on what they can do. First, they mainly decide disputes 
that arise out of events that have taken place in the past. (Occasionally they 
decide cases involving on-going situations, but, for reasons discussed in the next 
subsection, they do not manage those disputes particularly well). Second, their 
principal remedy for a dispute consists in punishment -- in a civil case, money 
damages; in a criminal case, a penal sentence or a money fine. Third, because 
courts sometimes try cases of enormous consequences for the parties (for example, 
capital cases in countries still maintaining the death penalty), in every country 
procedures in courts of general jurisdiction (that is, courts tha t can try cases of any 
magnitude) tend to have detailed, complex, formal rules appropriate for 
painstaking decision-making. Unfortunately, that makes the courts slow and 
cumbersome, even in cases that do not warrant such painstaking care. Fourth, 
those rules' detail and complexity, make an ordinary person · dependent on the 
asisstance of a lawyer or other specialized professional. (That makes courts 
extremely expensive •-- and hence inaccessible to the poor majority). Fifth, the 
English-style courts developed into adversarial forums, based on the theory that 
out of the conflict of opposing parties the truth arises -- a proposition that scholars 
have seriously questioned. Sixth, institutionally, courts must take an essentially 
reactive -- not proactive -- posture. They cannot implement a law unless in the 
course of a dispute somebody brings an appropriate law suit. Finally, rejecting 
mediation and compromise, these courts' dispute settlement system relies on 
applying a rule to a set of facts to reach a winner-takes-all decision. 
XXIV. The remainder of this sub-section discusses the consequences of these 
institutional limitations for the court as an agency ( 1) for settling the ordinary run 
of disputes; (2) for implementing business law in contrast to most development 
law; and (3) for implementing the law that controls government officials' 
discretion. 
XXV. English style courts 'settle' disputes in a quixotic manner. In any 
substantial meaning, 'dispute-settlement' implies, as far as possible, dissolving the 
antagonism between the parties so that social harmony may prevail. In different 
societies, customary institutions -- a village headman, a council of elders, a 
religious functionary , sometimes an entire village -- settle disputes, not by rigid 
application of a relevant rule that ends with winner-take-all. but by mediation and 
compromise within a framework of relatively vauge agreed-upon norms. To 
'take somebody to court' in a village community says that one is weary of 
disputing and wants to resume civil relationships; to take someone to an English-
style court declares that one never wants to speak to the defendant again. If the 
courts' only claim to distinction lay in settling run-of-the-mill disputes within 
families, between neighbors and the like, one might well question the utility of 
focussing UNDP's attention upon them. 
XXVI. The courts' institutional limits also hinder them from playing an effective 
role in implementing development laws. For a market-powered economy, the 
state needs laws to establish what one might call the market's infrastructure. 
Increased agricultural production for the market likely requir c-s an Agricultural 
Credit Law, a Feeder Road Law, an Agricultural Extension law, To ensure high-
level manpower to facilitate industrial growth probably requires a law to foster 
education. These kinds of laws, all looking to deep-seated institutional change to 
enable 'development ,' typically employ a wide variety of implementing agencies: 
Agricultural extension agencies to foster agricultural production; an education 
ministry for the educational system; hospitals and the ministr y of health for health 
care delivery; the Miriistry of Mines for mining , the Central Bank, the Tax 
Department , and the Ministry of Finance for fiscal affairs. These kinds oflaws 
rarely look to the courts for their implementation . Almost ne ; er does a university 
law, for example , rise to litigable causes of action; yet, in most developing 
countries , no law has greater importance than one that trains high-level manpower. 
Implementation of these kinds of development cannot wait for a court to react to a 
complainant's suit. Furthermore , implementation of most development laws 
require expenditures -- but courts have no power of the purse. In short , the courts' 
institutional limitatio us rule them out as government's principal agency for 
implementing most developmental laws. 
XXVII. What may appear as dysfunctional institutional limitations on a 
court's powers to implement some kinds of laws, however , become positive assets 
for implementing business-related laws. Business disputes frequently involve 
large sums of money ~ and merit careful, if slow, procedures. The parties likely can 
afford competent profession representation, so the adversary system really does 
likely produce something close to 'the truth'. To hang the court's implementation 
of the rules on an entrepreneur's initiative in bringing a lawsuit hinges 
implementation on the private activity of the persons affected } a posture that 
accords well with free: market principles ; in businesspeople's affairs , government 
should intervene only when called in by the parties. That almost always money 
damages comprise tht, remedy also accords with market notic ns which tend to 
reduce human relatio nships to a price. In short , for implementing commercial 
laws in the course of ~;ettling business disputes, courts becom e the implementation 
agency of choice . 
XXVIII. Courts serve as the implementing agency par excell ence for laws of great 
importance to developing a market-driven economy: The laws that 
businesspersons rely upon when they do business. Contract law, property law, 
corporation law, insurance law, banking law, negotiable instruments law, sales 
law, securities law: All of these depend entirely or in large part for their 
implementation upon the courts. Courts implement contract law in the course of 
determining contract disputes. A Securities and Exchange Commission usually 
oversees many aspects of a securities and exchange law, but a major share of 
implementation falls also to the courts as part of their dispute settlement function. 
XXIX . Although not sufficient , in other words, a competent court system 
proves a necessary institution for the development of a market economy . If 
businesspersons have no means of enforcing a contract according to law, they 
likely will have some difficulty in predicting the outcome of heir engagements. 
For some , that may bc:come a substantial disincentive to invest. Ensuring that the 
courts move expeditiously and fairly, and decide cases by the impartial application 
of rules to facts brought to the court's attention by an adversa rial, rational process 
potentially constitute s a highly important point of entry for an aid agency disposed 
to help a country improve its market conditions. 10 
XXX. Courts also perform an important function in enforcing administrative 
law: the body of rules that govern the way administrative officials behave pursuant 
to laws addressed to them -- including those in government agencies that 
implement developm Pnt law. As Fig . 1 (para. XX) above demonstrates , Every 
10 That does n e t say , as some theorists have , that cour cs const it ute the only 
significant i mplementi n g agency in development ; for an extreme version of that view , 
see Ri chard A. Posner , "Creating a Legal Framework for Deve lopment ," 13 THE WORLD 
BANK RESEARCH OBSERVER 1 1 1998) . The legal framework for a market cons i sts of much more 
than businessperson ' s laws. A myopic concentrat i on on co urts as the only 
significant ' legal ' i n stitution see ms as foolish as ig nor ing their specia l 
contribution towards t t ,e development of an hospitable climate [ ) r investment. 
law, explicitly or implicitly addresses not only the primary role occupunt; it also 
addresses the implem 1:;nting agency. 
XXXI. As H.L.A.Hart has pointed out, 11 a government disintegrates unless most 
of its officials feel an internal obligation to obey the rules addressed to them. For 
policing the occasional deviant official, governments generally rely upon the 
sanctions implicit in the employment relationship: A civil servant who too 
flagrantly defies the rules addressed to his or her position risks getting sacked, or 
at least a transfer to a far corner of the polity. 
XXXII. Officials wbo violate the rules addressed to them frequently tread on the 
toes of private individuals. For those individuals, the courts serve as the final 
bulwark against errant public servants. Other government institutions, like 
Nepal's Commission to Investigate Abuses of Authority (CIAA), the Judicial 
Council, and the Civil Service Commission, may help to ensure good governance. 
For a person whom public employees injure by abusing their powers, however, a 
court becomes truly 'the court of last resort'. Unlike any other office in 
government, a court must open when a litigant knocks. That ~lone justifies the 
courts' special place in the ideology and practice of good governance. 
XXXIII. In this respect, the court's law-job does not allmv it to substitute its 
decision for a civil servant's. It does require a judge to ensure that the civil servant 
made the decision for public-viewing, not private-viewing considerations; that the 
civil servant took into account only matters authorized by the governing law; that 
in ordering government action the civil servant stayed withi:1 the powers granted 
11 H. L . A. Hart , THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1962) . 
by law; and that the civil servant followed the procedural laws concerning 
decisions of that sort. i 2 That in making decisions civil servants must act pursuant 
to the law both substantively and procedurally constitutes the essence of the Rule 
of Law: That government itself remains subject to the law. 13 
XXXIV. In short , courts constitute an important impleme nting agency in 
ensuring an adequate legal framework for a developing , market-powered 
economy. Their policing role, however, comes to naught if the existing rules 
( constitutional or statutory) do not require accountability , transparency , decision 
by rule , and stakeholders' participation. That underpins the recommendation that, 
as a second strategy entry point , the UNDP should focus on legislative drafting. 
(2). Legal drafting , development and good gove rnance 
XXXV. Because: of their prominence in the popular perception of the legal 
order , courts becfome an inuitive point for concentration of donor effortds with 
respect to good governance. That seems necessary but not sufficient. A second 
poin t of entry colnsi sts in the bill-c reating system -- that is, the process by which 
a bright idea becomes a bill presented to Cabinet. 
XXXVI. The legal order performs many social jobs; in bringing about 
12 In English law, subsumed under the heading of ' natural justice '; in U. S . law , 
under the rulkes of t he applicable Administrative Procedure Act and the rubric of 
due pr o cess of law. ::..1. Nepal , of course , the Constitution i mposes a bas i c set of 
limits on executive anct administrative power . 
13 Sometimes the s ame point is put into ' rights ' language: The Court guarantees 
the rights of the cit :i.zens . For ev ery ' right ', however, a co r relative duty exists , 
or the 'right ' has r,o meaning. Those correlative duties mainly fa ll on civil 
servants . These duti e s find their definition in rules of behav i or prescribed by 
law : That civ i l serva ;1ts shall behave in a way that exercises the powers granted to 
them in accordance wi t h the law -- not for private - viewing b ut for public - viewing 
reasons. Courts do n ot always constitute the only resort for those whom government 
oppresses. Frequently . however , courts constitute their last i~ sort . 
development and ensuring good governance, however, law's function in 
channeling social behaviors holds pride of place. In pursuance of that function, as 
stated above, every government policy publicly avowed and seriously intended 
sooner or later becomes a rule promulgated by government -- i.e., a law. Most of 
those rulesw never appear in court: Central bank law, agricultural extension law, 
education law, transport law, energy law, health care delivery law, forest 
conservation law, mining law, a whole library of others. Save marginally, 
improvements to the c:ourt system and building judicial capacity will not likely 
improve the quality of governance with respect to these laws 
XXXVII. That fact undersGores the two principal reasons for recommending 
that legislative drafting serve as a second, complementary entry point for UNDP 
interventions with respect of the legal order. First, a law must contain detailed 
measures that take into account the existing legal and especially the non-legal 
surround of its primary addressees, and of the agency designed to implement it. 
The laws words must communicate the rules clearly, unambiguously and 
understandably. If in either respect the law misses the mark of competent drafting 
either substantivcely or technically, it will not likely succeed in inducing its 
prescribed behaviors. Unless the rules both prescribe behaviors likely to help to 
resolve the original social problem, and actually induce those behaviors, it cannot 
ensure the policy's effective implementation -- and effectivel y implemented 
policies constitute an indispensable element in good governance. 
XXXVIII. Effective rules require competent drafting not only with respect of the 
form of the words used, although competent form goes a long way to ensuring 
clarity and unambiguuusness. Competent drafting also cone ;rns the details put 
into the law. Unless those details take into account the legal and non-legal 
circumstances of the new law's addressees, they will only accidentally induce the 
prescribed new behaviors. Typically, deciding those details takes place at the 
point of drafting the rules. Writing is thinking. Until required to write down the 
rules, government officials seldom think through the new law's details. Policy 
lurks in the details; there hides the devil. 
XXXIX. Because writing means thinking, a UNDP strategy designed to build 
capacity among Nepalese officials and government lawyers to draft new rules and 
regulations that turn policy into law will provide assistance at the point at which 
they most need that capacity: When they write down the details that determine the 
operative face of policy. Writing polices into laws constitutes the point in the 
decision-process when the operative meaning of the policy falls for explication 
and detailing; by the same token, detailing the policy takes place at the point of 
writing out the rules that define it. 
XL. As two interrelated entry points for UNDP efforts , courts and drafting have 
two added benefits. First, both have a wide a reach that would offer UNDP entry 
into a wide range of fields of substantive laws or institutions ~mbordinate to those 
laws which might prove of particular interest to various donors. With respect of 
substantive law, for example, modules can readily be developed concerning 
intellectual property law, women's rights, criminal law, comrr ercial law, and so 
forth, using their drafting and how courts deal with these subjects as entry points. 
With respect to institutions , modules could be developed for strengthening the 
prosecutors' office, training judges both generally and in particular substantive 
fields, improving comt management and administration, strengthening CIAA and 
the Auditor General's department, and many others. All of these projects require 
an element of drafting; almost all of them, at some point, require some form of 
,. .  
judicial appeals. 
XLI. Second, both of these entry points require enabling Nepalese to develop 
their own capacities to undertake the tasks at hand. As a major reason for Nepal's 
governance problems , this Report identifies its officials' lack of capacity to draft 
the laws they need, and the courts' inability to help enforce them fairly and with 
justice. That calls for building Nepalese capacity: training to enable drafters who, 
knowing their country's non-legal constraints and resources better than any 
expatriate lawyer ever could, to draft detailed laws; and training of qualified, 
independent judges tl' make just decisions according to the criteria and procedures 
inscribed in those law. 
Summary 
XLII. As two interrelated strategic entry points for hel ing Nepalese to 
strengthen the nation \; legal order as government's primary tovl for combatting 
poverty and vulnerability, this Project Proposal focusses on improving the courts 
and the drafting process. The next three sections propose more detailed measures 
which the UNDP might undertake to improve the drafting process and the courts, 
while undertaking its potentially crucial role in helping to improve the 
coordination of donor aid. 
II. The host country strategy: 
XLIII. In 1991, in the, search for better governance, Nepal transformed its 
governing institution s. To ward off corruption, its new ConsTitution created a 
court system that on p.iper seemed a very model of judicial independence; 
established a number 1Jf complementary watchdog agencies, including a 
Comptroller-Generat an Auditor-General, a Commission on Investigations of the 
Abuse of Authority (CIAA), and a Judicial Council; and gave the Parliament 
powers of overseeing the government's performance. The Ministry of Law and 
Justice has established a legislative drafting division which employs about 20 
drafters apparently well-schooled in traditional (English) drafting techniques. 14 To 
date, the Nepalese government's efforts to resolve the paradox that testifies to 
persistent poor governance mainly seem to consist in trying to make these existing 
institutons function better. 
XLIV. The government seems serious and determined to improve its courts. It 
established a Judicial Service Training Centre in 1981. It appointed a Court 
Management Committee that last year submitted an extensive and valuable 
detailed report on hov✓ to manage the courts better. 
XL V. The government has welcomed opportunities to improve the skills of its 
staff of drafters. In 1994, the Asia Foundation held a one wet ,k course in drafting 
in Nepal. Some officials from the MLJ's drafting division have attended courses 
in legislative drafting techniques in Rome and elsewhere. So far as appears from 
the material available to us, however, it appears that these training programs 
aimed to improve the MLJ drafting staffs technical drafting skills, not providing 
them with the theory and methodology they needed to translate policy into 
effectively implemented legislation. 
III Prior and ongoing assistance. 
14 Unfortunately, we did not have an opportunity to meet with 
them, but the Ministry spokesperson briefl y described the 
Division, and we read about their training in t h e reports listed 
in the bibliograp hy , Annex I. 
XL VI. The existing Judicial Service Training Centre has received substantial 
assistance from the Asia Foundation, funded by USAID. It has held workshops 
on curricula , and on specific capacities , for example , for district judges , for 
prosecutors , and for legislative drafters. It also helped Judici al Service Training 
College to prepare training manuals for various courses. The Asia Foundation 
recommended that Government upgrade that College to a 'Nepal Judicial 
Academy' ; we understand that the Ministry has drafted a bill to that effect, but we 
have not seen it, and it seems to remain unenacted. It has prepared useful reports 
on the needs for judic ial and other legal education , both for new appointees and 
for in-service trainin g. In 1996, the Asia Foundation request ed (we presume from 
USAID) a $2,385,000 grant for training at the College (and, ultimately , at the 
proposed new Nation al Judicial Academy. We did not have time to discover the 
presernt status of that request.) 
XLVII. As stated, a number of lawyers in the MLJ have received some 
training in legislative drafting techniques at various training centrees overseas , 
financed by various agencies. Apparently , the drafting process has not otherwise 
received attention from donors. 
IV. Institutional framework 
XLVIII. The Constitution provides for an independent ju dicial system, 
protecting judges aga inst removal from office save for cause , and prohibiting the 
government from reducing a judge's salary or other remunera tion during the 
judge's tenure of office.15 It empowers the Judicial Council, composed of the 
15 Consti t u t i on , Pa rt 11 . 
Chief Justice as ex officio chair, the Minister of Justice, the two senior judges of 
the Supreme Court, and one distinguished jurist appointed by the King -- as senior 
and presumably upright a group as one could gather in the Kingdom -- to 
recommend appointments, dismissal, transfer of and disciplinary action against 
judges. 16 The Judicia l Service Commission, consisting of many of the same 
dignitaries, controls other appointments to the judicial service. 
XLIX. Nepal's Public Service seems in principal to resemble the British 
Civil Service. Unlike the British civil service, however , its senior members 
apparently do not serve at the pleasure of the Minister. Instead, the public 
service's governing body consists of the Public Service Commission, which must 
approve all disciplinary measures. 
L. To control conuption, Nepal has established a number of watchdog 
agencies. These include the criminal justice system, CIAA, c1 somewhat elusive 
Special Police Unit, the Comptroller-General and the Auditor-General. 
LI. The officials who draft legislation -- termed 'drafters', broadly construed --
include the legally-trained personnel in the Drafting Division of the Ministry of 
Justice and Law; and also the line-ministry personnel responsible for preparing 
draft rules of laws. These rules may take the form of bills for _formal enactment by 
the Parliament, or draft administrative regulations (sometimes called 'subsidiary 
legislation') to guide ministry personnel in implementing already-enacted laws. 
16 Constit u t: .,,n , Art. 93 . 
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LII. The bill-creating system (see Box 1) apparently follow much the same 
pattern in all the ministries: The ministry officials (usually, the relevant ministry 
substantive expert) in consultation with the ministry's legal officer, where one 
exists) write what British practice denotes as a 'layman's draft', and some other 
governments term a 'c::mcept paper' -- sometimes an actual draft bill, more often a 
memorandum describing the proposed bill. The ministry forwards that to the 
Legislative Drafting Division in the Ministry of Law and Justice. That Division 
prepares a draft bill, which it sends to the originating ministry and other concerned 
ministries for review :ind comment. When the bill is settled, the originating 
ministry sends it to Cabinet. 
BOXl 
THE LAW-MAKING SYSTEM: BILL-CREATING AND LAW-
ENACTING DISTINGUISHED 
In this Proje c t Document, by 'the law-making sy s tem' we mean the 
system by whi c h an idea for legislation travels from its point of 
origin throug h approval by Parliament and promulgation by the 
King. By th e 'bill-creation system' we mean t h 3 part of that 
process that o ccurs from the point of origin of the idea for 
legislation (u sually, within a ministry) through its drafting, 
and presentation to, and approval by Cabinet. By the 'law-
enacting system' we mean the process by which t he Parliament 
considers an d appro v es a bill. 
Lill. Two organizations exist that might play a role in the drafting process: The 
Law Reform Commission and the Bar Association. (In fact, as we discuss below, 
apparently they do nc,t .) 
Section B: PROJECT JUSTIFICATION 
I. Problems to be addressed; The present situation 
LIV. This section addresses first the difficulties that occasion the present Project, 
and, second, its explanations. 17 
a .. The Difficu!ties 
LV. Long ago, Gunnar Myrdal gave a name -- 'soft development' -- to the 
difficulty that this Proposal addresses. Nowadays, the development community's 
term, 'poor governance,' means much the same thing. After Jescribing the 
problem's superficial manifestations , this section identifies whose and what 
behaviors comprise it. 
LVI. Almost wherever one looks in Nepal , one finds the same phenomenon: laws 
and regulations that, if implemented, would signficantly alleviate poverty and 
vulnerability; but, as the record shows, they do not induce the changed behaviors 
required to ensure the.ir effective implementation . Many documents and 
interviews report the widely-recognized slip between the law•-in-the-books and the 
law-in-action. This section details only a few examples relat ,d to development 
issues; the way the courts function; the civil service; the corn ption control 
agencies; and finally the bill-creating and law-enacting agenc ies. 
17 To justify 'c , .~ Project , this Proposal adopts a pr nlEo:rn.- solving methodology. 
(See SEIDMAN & SEIDMAN, 'l'HE STATE AND LAW IN THE DEVELOPMENT PROCES', Ch . 4) . It discusses , 
first , the principal difficulty in Nepal ' s system of governanc e : The paradox between 
the law - in - the-books :;nd the law - in - action , that is , the lac k mo f good governance 
indicated by the rela ~ ive ineffectiveness of so many of Nepal ' ~ seemingly be n if i cent 
governmental initiatives. Second , it seeks to explain those difficulties in terms 
of Nepal ' s legal order . Third , it explains why , of the man i f o ld aspects of Nepal ' s 
l egal order , this Pr oposal focusses mainly on courts and on the bill - creating 
process . Finally , it e xplains in general terms the Proposal , as a part i al solution 
for Nepal ' s difficult j es . The consultants gathered the info r mation on which this 
documen t rests in a s eries of interviews and discussions ir . Sri Lanka be t ween 5 
January and 22 January, as listed in Annex 1. 
( 1 ). Dev :dopment laws that don't work 
L VII. Our brief stay in Kathmandu did not give us time to visit line ministries to 
discuss their problems in implementing legislation relating to development. 
Nevertheless, we note several examples that came to our attention of inadequately 
implemented laws related to development. 
L VIII. Article 11 of the Constitution declares: 
"The state sharl not discriminate citizens on grounds of religion , color , sex, 
caste , community , or ideology or any of them. 
"Provided that special provisions may be made by law to protect or 
promote the interests of women, children, old people or those who are 
physically and mentally incapacitated or those who belong to a class which 
is economcally, socially and educationally backward." 
LIX. Numerous reports and anecdotes suggest that government officials 
sometimes may discriminate against women employees in terms of appointments 
and promotion. In the court system, to give one example , only two women judges 
have been appointed at the appellate level, and three at the district court level. 
One senior woman advocate described in some detail how, although by 
acknowledged rights of seniority she should have received the next appointment to 
the Supreme Court , the Judicial Council simply selected someone a number of 
years her junior. 
LX. The Rising Nepal March 12, 1999: 
"'Lost innocen ce' by Sushma Amatya. 
"We do not have have laws for prostitution but we do have laws for 
trafficking which need to be effectively implemented .... 
"'Trafficking is a major issue today. People in important positions have 
spoken against it. Issues about this has been raised in SAARC meetings .... 
"(A)ccording to Anuradha Koiral of Mai ti Nepal.. . .'Everyday there are about 
3 5 cases of missing girls, domestic violece, rape cases, abandoned children, 
kidnapping and so on .... The laws in the countries of point of origin and 
point of destination has to cooperate and be effective.'" 
LXI. The Rising Nepal (Kathmandu, Mar. 12, 199): 
"Des~ite orohihitiw h.v law,s~rmLoy .children uu1der 11, ierethave been seve 1 cases orv10 alron or., 1£ ~rf i:rTis 1o hfilll'lli an e uca Jon .... A recen sw;.vev reoo ... ro1una , 1 trren wor mg 1~ 1 1 ractones m seven anrehe.nt term's :ric1s.... ~ort~·:ut oi c ar~e tne . . f go~ernmen rlcor not e ecuve1v 1 10 em1 tm aws r ar m : .exgJ101tat10n otnuar.en 1an :ne1r na1 ns.K. ungersucn ar 11 wor g co tlltl ns, especial y m olJacco actones. 
LXII. A law requires vehicle owners to have their vehic.:les inspected and 
repaired to prevent emission of carbon monoxide fumes. One only needs to step 
outside the doors of the UNDP office, however, to realize that the responsible 
ministries have not taken effective measures to enforce this law. 
LXIII. Efforts to decentralize government have produced legislation that 
purports to empower villagers to manage their resources at the local level. Yet a 
two year field study 18 exposed the reality: The Forestry authorities have continued 
to enforce measures to protect the forests without making much, if any, effort to 
consult the local community members about their need to obtain fuel wood, 
pasturage, and even foodstuffs in the forests. 
LXIV. These examples illustrate what appears as a wid espread failure of 
government officials to implement existing legislation designed to protect and 
advance community v.relfare. Widespread evidence demonstrates that the paradox 
1 8 
199 9 . 
Cf Ge o r q e Viros' (?) PhD thesis, Ind i.anna Uni v ersity, 
also pervades the jud :cial system. 
(2). The courts 
LXV. In the U.K. and the United States, lawyers fondly believe that if only courts 
have the kind of independence guaranteed by Nepal's Constitution, the judges 
cannot fail to provide an adequate system of justice. In Nep, 1, that proposition 
seems problematic. At all levels, three difficulties seem to plague Nepal's courts: 
Delay , corruption, and inconsistent judgments. From clerks w the justices, the 
courts exhibit these failings. The district-level judges "suffered from a chronic 
lack of materials and training, including update of Nepali laws. A former Chief 
Justice compared the district courts to 'fishmarkets'." 19 In the Supreme Court, the 
turnaround time for petitions for revision in 1994 was 9 yean :, 4 months. 20 
Despite the constitutional provisions and the apparently impeccable membership 
of the Judicial Counc il, several observers have complained about the appointment 
of judges, which "are being made on political pressure and the result is that the 
judiciary is being widely criticized for its poor performance. "2 1 
LXVI. In every field, delay detrimentally affects the courts as dispute-
settlement institutions: Criminal law, commercial law, family law, and so on. 
Judges frequently gave inconsistent decisions; lawyers complain that the law has 
lost predictability. Bad enough in any case, that unpredictability especially affects 
19 IDEA , p.22 . 
20 Samuel D. Ce nti and Robert D. Lipscher , "A Rev i ew r,nd Recommendatio n s of 
the Supreme Court of N2pal ," The Asia Fo undati o n, 1994, p. 7. 
21 B. P. Bandari , " A Bri ef Study on Effective Judicial ::3ystem and Corrupt i on 
Control Mechanism ", ( l .!98 ) (no publisher cited ) . 
the utility of the courts as an essential institution for impleme nting 
businessperson's law: The courts' great claim as an instru me 1t to foster market 
relationships lies in this, that they enable business people accurately to predict the 
outcomes of their contracts and other business relationships. Entrepreneurs have 
enough trouble trying to outguess the market. If Nepal wishes to provide an 
hospitable investment climate, its courts should help interpret laws as predictably 
as possible. Inconsis tent judgments defy predictability. 
LXVII. Corruption -- by all accounts, endemic in Nepal's courts22-- also 
undermines judicial predictability . Here , we distinguish betv-een 'petty' corruption 
and 'grand' ( or 'high level') corruption. Corruption by a clerk who will not 
advance an individua l's papers except for an illegal mulct has different 
consequences for dec ision-making than high-level bribery. High-level bribery, in 
contrast, always involves a transfer of decision-making powe r from a public 
official to the private interest that gives the bribe. However annoying and 
subversive of government's legitimacy , low level corruption at least does not 
transfer power from legitimate officials to those with enough money and power to 
bribe. High level con uption not only implicates legitimacy; it shifts the locus of 
power from legitimat e authority to a person with enough money to bribe. 
LXVIII. Laws that on their face seem adequate to ensure judicial 
independence and probity, and therefore an adequate system of justice, belied by 
delay , inconsistent ju dgments , and corruption: Those charact eristics apparently 
mark Nepal's courts . 
22 Shrestha e t al., p. 1 9 . We me t n ob o d y in gove rnment o r 
o ut of t h is who c o nt e st e d th i s sta te me nt. 
LXIX. Apparently corruption also exists in the police force. The Police Act, we 
were told, requires every senior officer to declare his or her assets, and permits the 
Inspector General to mvestigate any officer's income. According to a high 
official, however, this regulation, too, remains unenforced. 
(3). The public service 
LXX. The Nepali cjvil service in principle follows the Britjsh model of official 
neutrality. In practic e, at every change in government, the politicians shuffle the 
senior posts. A detailed assessment by a Nepali team of experts concluded: 
LXXI. 
"According to rules any positions and careers in the public service are not 
dependent on political or personal connections. Civil service as a whole is 
treated as politically neutral; position by law. But in practice, mainly 
positions such as Secretary, Department Chief, CDO, LDO, DEO, CEO, and 
other lucrative and easy money making positions such as revenue are 
dependent on political or person connections. Generally, change of 
incumbents in these positions takes place with the change in government in 
power." 23 
By law, punishment of a civil servant lies in the hands of the Public 
Service Commission. "In practice, political influences are used as punishment in 
the form of posting to remote areas, reserve pool and unimportant positions, and 
reward in the form of foreign training and posting in the 'lucrative' jobs for 
politically identified and Afnomanchhe. "24 
( 4). Watch-dog institutions 
23 Shrestha et ~l ., p . 94 . 
24 I d. at 98 . 
LXXII. Nepal has created created a number of institutions aimed directly at 
the issue of corruptio . The same phenomenon, however, of laws that on their 
face seem beneficent , but do not produce action to solve the social problems at 
which they supposedly aim, appears even in the watchdog institutions created by 
legislation. 
A. The first line of defence against corruption everyplace would seem to 
lie in the criminal justice system itself: The substantive criminal law, the 
police, the prosecutors, the judges, the prisons. Nepal has these institutions 
in place, and laws that detail their duties -- but corrupti m continues. 
B. The Committee for Investigation of the Abuse of Authority (CIAA), 
(Nepal's equivilent of an Ombudsman) registers compl~ints from the public 
on matters of corruption and 'improper' conduct and illegal activities; in 
1996/97 it received 1645 complaints, 11 telephone calls registering 
complaints, and considered 151 items in newspapers concerning possible 
corruption. 25 Apparently, it has exposed a variety of illegal behaviors. 
When it discovers an illegal act -- for example, corruption -- it investigates 
the matter with its own personnel, all of them regular public servants 
seconded to the Commission, usually for relatively short periods. After 
gathering evidence, the CIAA , if it deems prosecution warranted, turns the 
file over to the oublic prosecutor. The prosecutor carries the laboring oar 
after that. By its statute, the Commission has the power to recommend to 
government in~titutional changes to reduce the possibilities of corruption; 
on occasion, it has done so. 
25 Shrestha , su ~ra n . , at 70 . 
C. The prosecutors appear overburdened and poorly paid. As a result, they 
sometimes let c0rruption cases languish. When they do prosecute, their 
preparation of the cases does not always prove adequate, especially when 
they confront highly-paid lawyers defending wealthy clients accused of 
corrupt behaviors. 
D. A Special Police Department, on instruction from t~e CIAA, supposedly 
investigates corruption and complaints of misconduct. No clarity seems to 
exist as to its responsibilities. 26 
E. Extensive laws appear , on paper, to ensure adequate supervision of 
Ministry expenditures: 
26 
1. Ministries must provide quarterly progres s reports to the 
National Planning Commission and to the Natior al Development 
Council chaired by the Prime Minister, specifyir .g its officers' 
activities and expenditures in relation to planned targets. 
2. Nepal has apparently adopted the British system of controlling 
ministeri al expenditure . A ministry's Secretary h-ls the responsibility 
of ensuring that a ministry makes no expenditures except those 
authorized by law. In principle , the Secretary remains personally 
accounta ble to the Parliamentary Accounts Committee for 
Sh r estha et .,.1 ., p . 71 , state that " at the instruc1 ~ion of t h e CIAA , the 
Spec i al Police Depart ment also investigaes corruption and cowplaints of mi sconduct 
cases. " We fou n d nobo d y , neither the CIAA staff nor the senio .1· police conc u l tant to 
whom we spoke , who cou i d tell us anything about t h e Special Po 1 ·, ce Unit . 
expendit .1res made in violation of law. 
3. The Financial Comptroller's Office has assigned an accountant 
to every ministry to provide a double check on ministry expenditures; 
and reports transgressions to the Auditor General. This process 
entails many delays as ministries tum in completed reports well after 
the state<l deadline; the Auditor General normall y submits his final 
report to the king 12 or more months after the fiscal year has ended, 
and then Finance Minister lays it before the Parliament where it goes 
to the Parliament Accounts Committee (PAC) for scrutiny and debate 
in the context of existing rules. 
4. Composed of 33 MPs and chaired by a member of the 
Opposition Party, PAC invites ministries and the , Auditor General for 
questioning. It then issues directives and sugg estions to the Auditor 
General' s Office and the ministries on the irregularities found. 
5. The Auditor General publicizes financial transgressions and 
various agencies initiate actions to penalize the transgressors in 
accordance with prevailing laws , but the legal process and procedures 
seem inordinately long and ineffective. Some ministries apparently 
simply ignore recommendations, or interpret corruption cases as 
financial irregularities and therefore do not puni ·,h them. 
LXXIII. Despite this panoply of laws and institutions supposedly designed to 
prevent corruption and to ensure the regular and lawful expenditure of public 
monies, peculation continues at an awe-inspiring rate. In 1997 alone, the Auditor 
General's report revenied NRs. 4.5 billion misappropriated ; and NRs . 20 billion 
'unsettled' -- apparent ly spent in unaccounted-for ways. 27 Again, the written law 
does not correspond to the behaviors and institutions that actually exist. 
(5). The actors in the bill-creating system: the drafters . 
LXXIV. The relevant actors in Nepal's bill-creation system consist of the 
legislative 
drafters, including ministry personnel. These officials have produced laws that 
purportedly aim at solving the social problems that plague the legal order. They 
have made many suggestions for improved legislation and regulations. 
Apparently , however , they have proven unable to overcome the pervasive 
difficulties that have hindered their proposed legislation's effective 
implementation. 
LXXV. The Law Reform Commission seems to have fallen on bad times. It 
does not have a full complement of officials, it has a minuscu le staff; government 
does not, apparently , call upon it for anything. A draft Law Reform Act that 
would give it more status and make it more useful to government has apparently 
languished for some years. 
LXXVI. Finally , Nepal has some 4580 attorneys working i11 both public and 
private spheres. The Nepali Bar Association contains some of the most senior 
practitioners in the cmmtry. Nevertheless , the Government has not regularly 
called upon its memb ers either to draft or to critique legislation drafted by 
27 Shrestha et a l . , p . 11 
government officials. 
LXXVII. Despite t ese institutions' efforts, and many more, Nepal's laws stills 
seem systematically to miss the mark. That signals Nepal's failure to meet the first 
criteria of good governance: Effectiveness in managing development programs. 
Nor does Nepal meet the good governance's second criteriion: Non-arbitrary 
decision-making by rule. Where corruption exists, arbitrary decision-making 
holds sway. 
LXXVIII. Nepal has established bill-creating and law-enacting institutions that 
no doubt aim to prod uce effective , non-arbitrary laws. The drafters, however, have 
not produced development-oriented legislation that works, or that transparent, 
accountable, participatory implementing decisions that decid e pursuant to rules. 
(6). The law-enacting system 
LXXIX. Cabinet. The Cabinet has responsibility for reviewing, revising as 
necessary, and ultima tely approving bills received from the line ministries for 
submission to the Parliament. After receipt of a bill from the originating ministry, 
sometimes, but not always, the Cabinet forwards it to the Cabinet Committee on 
Legislation for further discussion. CCL holds that discussion with relevant 
ministerial Secretarie s in attendance. CCL then returns the bill to Cabinet whose 
Secretariat provides some of the materials necessary to asses s the bill. If the bill 
has financial implications, or impacts government policy, the originating Minister 
explains the bill to Cabinet. The full Cabinet does not always discuss a bill very 
searchingly. The Local Government Bill, for example, went through Cabinet 
without much debat e. 
LXXX. Cabinet' s members apparently have no way of using facts and logic to 
make one crucial pol"tical decision: How to prioritize the use of scarce 
government law-drafting resources to produce bills for forwarding to the 
Parliament. Furthermore, they have little basis on which to assess whether those 
bills will likely induce the new, development-oriented behaviors required to 
implement the detailed measures proposed. Once Cabinet has approved a bill, it 
goes to Parliament. 
LXXXI. Parliament. The Parliament comprises two Chambers: the Lower 
House of Representatives with 205 seats; and the Upper Hom'e with 60 seats. The 
Parliamentary Secretariat includes a Secretary General and one Secretary each for 
the Upper and Lower House. It has a library, about 20 computers, and an audio 
system in the parliamentary caucus rooms and the Speaker's office. This 
Secretariat services the MPs and their committees. Parliament sits twice a year for 
regular sessions to consider the budget ( about three months), and one month for a 
winter session. The Constitution empowers 25 percent of the Lower House 
members to petition the King to call a special session, suppo sedly for an 
'emergency' -- presumably, to meet emergencies like civil war, famine, or 
depression. The spec:v'ial sessions thus convened, however, met for a vote of no-
confidence in the government. 
LXXXII. The Parliament has 11 Committees, of which the Pa liament Accounts 
Committee has become the best known. Two Committees, recently established in 
response to public complaints about corruption, include one on Parliamentary 
Privileges and one on Ethics. The latter, whose members include the Prime 
Minister and the Speaker, has met twice, but its members appear to have too many 
'• 
other tasks to work effectively even to draft rules of procedur e. The other eight 
committees deal with substance: Economics , Foreign Affairs nd Human Rights, 
Natural Resources and Environment Protection, Population and Social Affairs, 
Development and Communication , State Affairs and Remote Areas. These 
committees apparentl y perform a fairly effective role in overseeing ministry 
activities. 28 MPs may invite government and private experts to meet with the 
Committees on specific issues , and the Secretariat may suggest others. The 
Committee members do debate specific bills, although usually behind closed 
doors; 29 apparently some MPs fear that, if they speak out publicly on controversial 
issues , they may lose their parties' support in the next elections . The 
Parliamentary Secretariat , however , provides the full Parliament with reports on 
the issues the Commi t.tees have discussed. 
LXXXIII. The MPs apparently mainly comprise local polit ;cal workers. They 
seldom initiate bills on their own; since 1991 MPs have enacted only three 
'private' bills. The government provides every MP with funds for an office and a 
staff member in their home areas; but not all of them hire an) one or even return 
home between sessions. IDEA documented several problema tic behaviors on the 
part of some MPs. 30 Only about 20 percent participate actively in the legislative 
process. Some exhibit 'a tendency to indulge in horse-trading and defections' and 
a 'culture of legislati v~ corruption.' 31 Almost invariably , given inadequate facts 
concerning the causes of the social problems proposed bills ciaim to address, the 
28 Apparently che 1994 dissolution of Parliament resu l ted from a Committee 
investigation of the Pr ime Minister and some other senior offi ~ i als . 
29 Others have s riticized this as blocking needed tran T arency . IDEA reports 
that ' Certain parliamentary procedures do not appear to be dem c ,.::ratic. ' 
3D P. 16 . 
31 Id. 
MPs have little choice but to approve those that seem to conform with their 
parties' stated positions. On the one hand, that contributes to a polarization of the 
decision-making proc~ss of which observers have frequently complained; on the 
other, the system does not ensure that proposed bills or regulations incorporate the 
kinds of detailed measures required to induce the behaviors they purport to 
prescribe. 
LXXXIV. Local authorities. Various acts have recently granted subnational 
authorities ( district, towns, and village levels) significant po\\-ers in relation to 
law-making, revenue raising, spending and recruitment and deployment of staff, 
but small towns and villages have not yet exercised these powers to the fullest. A 
new umbrella law, enacted by Parliament, remains as yet unpromulgated, but 
whether it will foster greater local government action seems questionable. 
(7). Summary 
LXXXV. Nepal exhibits 'soft development' at almost every point that one 
looks. A vast gap exists between the law-in-the-books and the law-in-action. 
Despite laws on their face unexceptionable, development programs do not work 
very well; environmental laws do not lead to behaviors that protect the 
environment; despite laws guaranteeing judicial independence, the courts seem 
slow, on at least the lower court levels, uninformed., and corrupt; constitutionally 
established watchdog agencies do not seem to prevent corrupt ion on many levels; 
the institutions of bill -drafting and law-enactment do not produce bills that induce 
conforming behaviors. This proposal does not aim at the civil service generally, 
that is, the implement ing agencies for most laws dealing with development; we 
understand that the A..;ian Development Bank has undertaken aid to that sector. In 
the next section, we discuss explanations for these problemat ic behaviors by 
courts, drafters, Cabi 1~et and Parliament. 
b. Explanations 
LXXXVI. This section offers some hypotheses to explain the problematic 
behaviors that hinde r good governance in Nepal. It looks at the possible causes of 
selected aspects of the problematic behaviors that plague four key institution 
related to good governance: first, the Nepalese judiciary; second, the existing 
'watchdog' agencies; third , the bill-creating; and, finally, the law-enacting systems. 
The remainder of this Proposal then builds on these explana tions to design a set 
of solutions. 
( 1) The judiciary: Why delays , corruption , and unpredictable 
decision s? 
LXXXVII. Over the years, both Nepali and foreign experts have studied the 
Nepali judiciary. Their analyses provide considerable insight into the causes of 
the problematic behaviors that plague the judiciary. These causes fall primarily 
into two categories: (.I) the Nepalese circumstances, including the existing rules; 
and (2) the institutional limits of the courts' potential for imp]ementing the laws. 
(a). Nepalese circumstances affecting the courts' performance 
LXXXVIII. The three identified difficulties in the com s' performance --
delay, corruption, and unpredictability -- have different explanations. Delay 
results from the action of clerks and other court administrator~, as well as the 
judges. On the Supreme Court level this has received careful attention;32 others 
have equally carefully studied the lower courts and the Bar.33 We do not repeat 
that analysis here, but merely replicate in the next Part the list of tasks that other 
researchers have suggested need attention. 
LXXXIX. Corruption in the courts in Nepal recalls Mark Twain's remark about 
the weather: Everybody talks about it, but nobody does anything. Before one can 
suggest a remedy, one must explain the phenomenon. Here we discuss only 
bribes. 34 That judges or other officials take bribes obviously reflects in part their 
human weaknesses -- their acquisitiveness, and the loose values and attitudes that 
apparently condone acceptance of bribes. The law combats those human 
weaknesses by threat::; of punishment. The question then bee Jmes why the 
32 Conti & Lips c her , supra n. ??. 
33 Secretaria t of the Court Management Committee, Supr 8me Court , " Summary of 
the Report on SuggesL .ons made by the Court Management Commi t tee , 2055 " (n.p . ) (a 
principal cause of the judiciary ' s current delays and diffi c ulties in combatting 
corruption in its own r anks lie in the insufficiency of th e ex j sting legal framework 
within which its pers c nnel administer the system of justice , a nd the lack of well -
qualified personnel a t many l evels . As to the first , the Management Committe e has 
l isted several weaknei, s es or gaps which the Committee maintains lie in the existing 
laws governing the cou r ts. For example : 
Error! Mliin Document Only. . Existing law prev r:, ts the underutilized 
revenue a nd adm ini strative c ourt authorities ' from hearing appeals 
against c,f ficials initial decisi o ns relating to ' axes , customs , exc i se 
duties and land revenue ; contracts between goverr .ment and individua l s ; 
profiteer ~ng ; pun ishm ents of government employees ; 
Error! Main 
Auth o rit ie s 
arbitrat i m ; 
Document Only . . even if 
have no auth o rity to 
the par : ies so desire , Local 
settle !Jin or cases through 
Error! Main Document Only. . no criter i a and pro r;edures ex i st defining 
a concili d tion f uncti ons undertaken at the Court ' s initiative; 
Error! Ma :..n Document Only . . Under ex isting lc:w , the Judges cannot 
undertake any one of several possible a l ternati ve s for r ed ucing delays 
in court ~ roceedings . 
34 Reported thefts of cour t property, which r equire different 
explanations and differen t solutions, does not touch so directly 
on the quality of justice. 
criminal justice syste:n and the various watchdog institutions do not catch and 
punish more corrupt judges and court administrators and clerks, thus deterring 
their fellows. We discuss that below. 
XC. Other explanat ions exist for corruption in the courts. Corruption results not 
only because officials prove 'weak,' but also because of weak institutions: 
institutions that do not ensure accountability, transparency, judgment by rule, and 
participation. Those broad categories, of course, do not suffo.:e. With those 
categories in mind, to design an adequate set of judicial institutions that make 
bribery less likely calls for an intensive study, with the judges' and administrators' 
participation, to redesign the courts so as to maximize those elements of the Rule 
of Law. The Solutions Part of this Project Document proposes that a useful 
module for foreign as. istance might focus on engaging court officials in the 
conduct of research a" a basis for redesigning the courts to reduce existing 
opportunities for corrupt behaviors. 
XCI. Finally, Nepal' <:i judges apparently make unpredictable judgments. When a 
judge gives a judgment after a trial, the judge must first find the law that governs 
the case; second, the _i,udge must find the facts accurately; and, third, the judge 
must make a correct i!·tference from the rule and the facts to tl e judgment -- all in 
a way that seems appropriate to most Nepalese lawyers and judges (that is, in 
accordance with Nepalese 'legal culture'). To say that the judges make 
inconsistent decisiorn; means that they have failed at one of these three steps. If 
they cannot accuratel y find the law in the law books, they must rely on their own 
guess about the law. The decisions of the Supreme Court do not seem available to 
all the judges, so they cannot follow its precedents -- and henl;e may make 
inconsistent decisions. If a judge lacks proper training, a dee · sion about the law 
can fall beside the mcirk. If a judge cannot cannot find the facts or makes an 
incorrect inference from the facts available, either (a) the jud ge again may lack 
proper training; or (b) the fact finding institutions do not pro 'uce evidence on 
which a judge could make a proper finding; or ( c) the judge has ignored the 
institution that provides a justification of the necessary inference -- mainly the 
publication of a written opinion giving the reasons for decision. All three reasons 
may combine to explain inconsistent judgments. Faced by a complex commercial 
case, for example. an insufficiently trained judge may well misread the law; fail to 
make adequate factual findings; or, by not writing an opinion or writing an 
incompetent one, fail to make a correct inference. 
(2). The watchdog agencies 
XCII. Here we examine the four watchdog agencies created by the 
Constitution: The Judicial Council; the CIAA; the Comptroll e:r General's office; 
and the Auditor General. As in other sectors of Nepal's legal .,ystem, both 
Nepalese and foreign consultants have extensively analyzed these agencies' 
difficulties. Existing laws purport to direct the Judicial Council, CIAA, and the 
criminal justice system (the police , prosecutors and the courts) to take steps to 
discourage corruption. None work very well. The Solutions part of this Project 
Document, again, recommends that each of these institutions might become the 
subject of a module for donor assistance . Since the first task for a donor-assisted 
project will necessari ly involve working with Nepalese officials to analyze the 
causes of these institutions' relative lack of success in hindering corruption, this 
section does not attempt to detail explanations of them. Instead, it focusses on a 
common weakness iru erent in relying mainly on these institut ions to prevent 
corruption. 
XCIII. Institutionally, all three institutions mainly seek to employ the 
criminal law to catch and punish corrupt officials or judges, apparently hoping to 
prevent corruption by general or special deterrence. All three,, that is to say, 
attempt to alter only ~me cause of corruption: the corrupt officials' (assumed) 
personal acquisitiveness and low moral level. Yet experienc e everywhere reveals 
that punishment for corruption constitutes a very difficult cure to administer. 
Bribery, for example, has no victim; it constitutes a victimles s crime. The two 
parties -- the briber and the person bribed -- both end up satisfied with the 
transaction. As in tratficking in women, gambling offenses a d drug crimes, no 
victim calls the police to alert them that a crime has occurred . 
XCIV. Unless enforcement agencies become proactive, the perpertrators of 
victimless crimes very frequently go unpunished. Unless the police vice squad 
actively searches for cases of trafficking, gambling or drug sales, the police likely 
never even know that a crime has occurred. 
XCV. The CIAA and the Judicial Council rely mainly on public complaints 
to trigger an investig ation of bribery charges. The Judicial Council has no staff to 
investigate these chai~~es; apparently , complaint letters receive only cursory 
attention. CIAA does keep a record of complaints, but its investigative staff seems 
incapable of handling all of them effectively. So far as we could learn, the police 
have no special corruption investigative unit -- and international experience 
suggests that investigating corruption requires sufficiently specialized skills as to 
demand an equally specialized department. No whistle-blow er statute provides an 
incentive for witness es to corruption to come forward. 
,; .... 
XCVI. In principle ~ two agencies oversee the expenditure of public monies. In 
light of the very high sums of public expenditures which the Auditor General has 
questioned, it seems c.;oubtful that they have the capacity to do so effectively. The 
Financial Comptrolier 's accountants, for example, know how to discover failures · 
to comply with budgeted line-item expenditures, but do not have the information 
necessary to assess the prices set on items included in the design of large projects 
for which only one or two companies bid. The Auditor-General has only some 
300-odd auditors to oversee 13,000 government units 35 a per year. Moreover, no 
mechanism exists by which the government can recover unauthorised payments 
from the officers con(;erned; and the Secretary or other accounting officer in the 
unit apparently can avoid personal liability by making some kind of excuse. 
XCVII. Government procurement -- everywhere a significant opportunity for 
corruption -- apparently takes place pursuant to the Financial Regulations of 1986. 
The Department and the Ministry of Law and Justice have these under 
consideration for redrafting to fit the 1999 Financial Procurement Act which 
together with its Regulations aim to remedy a number of problems evident in the 
existing regulations. Given time constraints, we did not have time to obtain and 
scrutinize the Act or the proposed regulations. The causes of persistent 
corruption, however, seem to lie in Nepali drafters' past inabiiity to produce 
effectively implementable legislation that, among other thing s, limits the 
opportunities for give;s and receivers to exchange 'favors;' this comprises an 
aspect of the larger problem that laws have too often proven '-i fficult, if not 
impossible, to implerr ent. 
35 Includin g national, district and mun.i.c J pal 
and government aut~nomous agencies and corporatio ns. 
authorities, 
(3). Why drafters have not proposed effectively implementable 
legislati on 
XCVIII. The several actors in the bill-creating process -- that is, mainly the 
drafters, broadly conceived (see Box 1) -- have generally neither produced nor 
provided adequate justifications to demonstrate the proposed legislation would 
ensure good governance and facilitate implementation of development initiatives. 
Available evidence relating to the Nepalese law-making process, considered also 
in light of other countries' experience, suggests several hypotheses to explain their 
problematic behavio rs: First, Nepal has no rules defining the criteria and 
procedures drafters and others in the bill-creating process should follow in 
deciding on proposed legislation; nor do any processes exist that in effect define 
those criteria. Cabinet, which receives the concept paper from a line ministry, has 
no defined system, either by rule or custom, for prioritizing the use of scarce 
drafting resources by ranking the order of drafting bills -- which results in neglect 
of the necessary in-depth investigations into Nepali circumstances, required to 
ensure effective implementation measures. 
XCIX. No requirement ensures that drafters not only provide seemingly 
technically proficient bills, but a form of justification (a report on the facts relating 
to Nepalese circumstances) which undergirds their draft bills' detailed measures. 
Indeed, the process of dividing the drafting tasks into ministry personnel's 
preparation of concept papers which the legally-trained drafting officials 
supposedly cast into acceptable legal forms conceals the reality: (1) The concept 
paper usually contains insufficient details for the lawyers in the MLJ's Drafting 
Division to construct che details of the proposed bill; (2) line ministry personnel 
seldom know how to translate broad policy into the detailed measures required to 
ensure a bill's effective implementation; (3) the lawyers in the Drafting Division 
also have neither the lheory nor methodology required to dra:fr legislation desinged 
to change institution s~ and ( 4) in drafting a bill's detailed measures, legally-trained 
officials frequently have little knowledge of the specific Nep alese circumstances 
that determine wheth er the bill's addressees -- both the prima ry addressees, and the 
implementing agency's officials -- will obey the new law. Experience elsewhere 
suggests that , without built-in, on-going cooperation between the ministry experts 
and legally-trained officials, the resulting bills will not likely take into account the 
non-legal factors that hinder obedience to a law's prescription s. 
C. Unless these two sets of drafters work together to prod uce an adequate 
research report to justify their bills, then for any but the simplest bills, likely most 
Cabinet members and legislators will neither know enough a out the relevant 
facts nor sufficiently understand the bills' circumstances to use reason informed by 
experience to assess their likely social consequences. Where the Cabinet 
Committee on Legislation examines a bill, with the attendance of the Secretaries 
of relevant line ministries and the Secretary for the Ministry of Law and Justice, 
CCL members may learn in the discussion about the bill sufficient to understand 
it; but the fruits of those discussions do not reach Parliament. That CCL 
discussion aside, it seems that some bills may well pass from the MLJ's Drafting 
Division into law without anyone scrupulously scrutinizing those bills' details' 
likely consequences. 
( 4). The !aw-enacting process : Parliament as a two-way 
commun ication channel 
CI. In principle, the law-enacting process consists of Cabinet and the 
Parliament, together vvith the formal requirement of Royal Assent. As noted 
above, in voting for b ills, MPs have almost always followed Party lines. Unless 
they have a basis in foct and logic on which to assess a bill, inevitably their 
debates over the bills degenerate into polarizing party partisanship. In these 
circumstances, it does not appear surprising that individual MPs conclude that the 
debate really matters Jittle, so they might as well act to reap their own personal 
benefits (as apparently some do, by defecting or accepting bribes). 
CII. As another important function, MPs ought to serve as a two-way 
communication channel between the Center and their constituencies. Presumably, 
MPs receive funds to employ staff members and set up office ,~ back home to 
enable them to perform this role. For, unless the citizens at large know and 
understand a law, they cannot evaluate either its implementation or its social 
impact. Unless MPs' ,:;onstituents can evaluate a law's implementation, they 
cannot through their Parliamentary representatives provide feedback about the 
law's actual effect to the lawmakers, thus contributing to necessary revisions. For 
citizens' participation to become more than symbolic, they must learn not only 
about the existence of a law, but about how to assess it. 
CIII. Utilizing Nepa l's new district and local government structures, MPs might 
develop into a two-way transmission system between the Cen,ter and the their 
constituents. Apparently, they do not do that now. We do n9t here try to offer a 
complete set of hypotheses to explain why they do not; we suggest only a single, 
partial explanation: Unless the MPs themselves have the facts and logic they 
require to assess a bill , they cannot readily provide them for their constituents. 
Given that they do not. receive very thorough well-structured written reports to 
provide the detailed information on which specific bills rest, few if any MPs can 
help their constituent 5 learn to use reason informed by exper i,~nce to evaluate 
either proposed bills or the ultimate laws' social impact. Another module for 
donor assistance might concentrate on strengthening the MPs' capacity to play 
their potential role as two-way communication channels to their constituents. 
( 5). Overlapping donor activities 
CIV. Given the extensive international assistance to many sets of actors in Nepal's 
legal order , the danger apparently exists that some donor activities may overlap or 
to frustrate each other. For example, apparently , donor agencies have already 
given considerable assistance designed to improve the capaci ty of the relevant 
actors in the law-mak ing process. 36 Parliament has received Danish aid to assist in 
improving the structui"e and equipment of Parliament's Secret ariat and the work of 
the legislators. In the past , other donors provided some train ing for the MPs, but 
terminated the progra m for lack of funds. The Asian Founda tion, in addition to 
extensive aid in the form of consultants in formulating training programs for the 
judiciary, provided some aid to Parliament. Apparently , the DIFD , too , had 
proposed to help establish a research and information center , but withdrew to 
avoid duplication ofDANIDA's efforts. This experience, perhaps duplicated in 
other sectors , suggest s that lack of coordinated donor assistance may not only 
result in the wastes of duplication , but also the withdrawal of much-needed aid 
under the mistaken apprehension that other donors seem engaged in providing it. 
36 As background ,-;oncern ing the government ' s position on , ,onor aid , the Cabinet 
Secretary explicitly .stated that a (apparently confidentiaJ : regulation requires 
that every aid proje ::t , wherever conce ived and by whatever donor pr ov ided , must 
receive Cabinet clearance . That, as we understand it , some of f icials have suggested 
UNDP p l ay a ro l e in c:oordinating donor aid , suggests that t t, is mechanism has not 
worked very well. 
'• 
(6) Summary 
CV. This section has suggested some tentative explanations for the problematic 
behaviors of five sets of actors: The courts; the watch-dog agencies; the drafters 
in the bill-creating process; MPs in their potentyial role as a tweo-way 
communication channel; and the donor community with respect to overlapping 
and conflicting aid programs in the area of governance. The remainder of this 
Project Document details the proposed program to address these causes. 
II. Expected end of project situation 
CVI.. At the end of the project, UNDP assistance will have a~complished the 
following tasks, all aimed at addressing the causes identified for the difficulties 
that plague Nepal's e:x isting legal order. 
A. A Legal Framework Donor Coordinating Committee of leading 
Nepalese legal personnel and donor organization representatives will exist to 
coordinate and advise on assistance to strengthening the Nepalese legal 
framework. It will hold regular round table discussions to identify the obstacles 
that hinder efforts to strengthen Nepal's legal order, and to analyze and find 
effective measures to ~vercome their causes. In cooperation with the line 
ministries, it will help develop modules designed to strengthe n various aspects of 
the legal order for which donors might provide assistance; and it will evaluate the 
progress made. In particular, it will work with the line ministries to identify 
priority legislation and undertake the necessary participatory investigations to 
ensure the resulting l~1ws will effectively enhance Nepal's development-enabling 
environment; for example, by increasing farmers' productivity and marketed 
'• 
output; improving small enterprises' ease of entry and production; strengthening 
the Nepalese transportation system; increasing adult literacy; rationalizing the 
welfare system; and other projects to build the infrastructure of a market-driven 
economy. 
1. The Coordinating Committee will have adopted guidelines for 
donor and Nepalese organizations joint efforts to formulate and implement 
projects to aid Nepali efforts to strengthen the national legal framework to foster 
good governance and self-reliant development. 
B. Capacity in MLJ and the line ministries to develop effective legislation 
to foster good governance and development will have increased, and a learning 
process will have begun to continally increase that capacity. 
1. A minimum often drafters from the Drafting Division ofMLJ, 
and twenty-five officials from the several line ministrioes will have attended a 
three week workshop in Nepal where they will have studied intensively how to 
develop legislation for development and good governance. 
2. In the course of that workshop, they will have developed, at least in 
outline form, five or priority bills and research reports that demonstrate their likely 
social impact. 
3. At least five drafters from the Drafting Division ofMLJ, one 
lecturer from the Administrative Staff College , one lecturer from the University's 
Faculty of Law, and e ·ght officials from the several line mini~tries will have 
completed an intensive four months' training program in legislative theory and 
.-
methodology , legisla :tve drafting techniques , soicial science reseasrch techniques 
for drafters, methodo logies for non-formal education, in the course of which they 
will have completed draft priority bills and research reports, and undertaken an 
intensive program of supervised reading in the foreign law and experience 
concerning their bills . 
4. The Administrative Staff College and the Law Faculty will have 
instituted courses in legislative theory and methodology and in legislative drafting 
techniques . 
5. MLJ will have produced a drafting manual in Nepali to guide 
drafters not only in drafting clear and unambiguous bills in simple Nepali, but also 
to guide them in writ ing adequate research reports to explain and to justify their 
bills. 
6. MLJ \vill have produced for Cabinet approval 1 draft Cabinet 
Memorandum prescribing the bill-creating process, includin g a requirement that 
for all significant bill :· drafters produce a research report and a social impact 
statement. 
C. The UNDP will have taken initiative to encourage and coordinate 
donors' responsibility for aiding specific modules related to the Nepalese efforts to 
strengthen the courts and the dispute settlement system, and other institutions 
related to the nationa i legal framework. These will include , fimong others: 
CVII. MODULE 1: ADDRESSING DELAY AND POOR MANAGEMENT 
IN THE COURT SYSTEM37 
A. Submodule lA: Drafting regulations for lower court administration 
B. Submoch.le 1B: Drafting regulations for appellate court 
administration. 
C. Submodule lC: Drafting regulations for Supreme Court 
administrntion. 
D. Submodule lD: Providing and installing computers for the courts of 
Nepal. 
E. Submod ,1le lE: Training court administrators and clerks in new 
systems Df court administration. 
F. Submodule lF: Drafting a new Civil Procedure --~ode. (By all 
accounts. the present procedure Code needs rednfting in many 
different ways. Part of that might include proce~.ures designed to cut 
down on the courts' case load and therefore delay, perhaps by 
providing for court-sponsored mediation). 
G. Submodule lG: Drafting a bill to develop community-level 
alternati ve dispute resolution institutions 
CVIII. MODULE 2: ADDRESSING CORRUPTION IN THE COURT 
SYSTEM 
A. Submod ule 2A: Drafting regulations designed to reduce low-level 
court cor;·uption. (Reducing low-level corruption depends in large 
part on reducing opportunities to manipulate calendar, lose files, etc., 
matters addressed in Submodules 1 A-E). 
B. Submodule 2B: Drafting a law to reduce high-le 1,el corruption in the 
courts (probably as a Code of Judicial Conduct; .md see below, 
37 Note : Funded by USAID , the Asia Foundation sponsored a consultancy in 1 994 
by Samuel D. Conti and Robert D. · Lipscher; the report is av. 0 i l able . We j have no 
knowledge about the e xc ent to which the Nepalese authorities r,ave proceeded on this 
report . The Report :>1, Suggestions made by the Court Manageme1 . t Committee , 2055 a l so 
conta i ns useful sugge:;,t.. .:ons . 
Submodule 3A) 
CIX. MODULE 3: ,'.VIAKING CONSISTENT JUDICIAL DECISIONS 
A. Submodule 3A: Drafting a law requiring that judges write adequate 
opinions (perhaps as part of the Code of Judicial Conduct ,mentioned 
in Submodule J2B) 
B. Submodule 3B: Training judges in selected areas oflaw: 
a. Commercial law, and business person's law generally 
b. Criminal procedure 
c. Human rights law 
d. Constitutional law 
e. Civil procedure 
f. Writing opinions 
g. Evidence 
C. Submodule 3C: Building physical capacity at the (proposed) Judicial 
Training College (books, computers, Internet access, etc.; to be 
available to the private bar as well as judges and others) 
D. Submod ule 3D: Building teaching capacity at the (proposed) Judicial 
Training College (training for teaching staff; supplying lecturers on 
secondm ent; building curriculum). 
E. Submodule 3E: Providing computer equipment, .:mftware, and 
training to facilitate the availability to all interested persons of 
information relating to existing laws and regulations, cases and court 
decisions; 
F. Submod ule 3F: Developing a court-reporting system to ensure that 
Supreme Court decisions and new statutes and regulations 
systematically are distributed at least to judges and lawyers. 
t 
ex. MODULE 4: IMPROVING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
A. Submodule 4A: Drafting selected reforms of the substantive criminal 
law ( after consultation, determining specific crimes that need 
redrafting -- e.g. the law of conspiracy) 
B. Submodule 4B: Drafting selected reforms of the criminal procedure 
law 
C. Submodule 4C: Building capacity in the prosecutorial service (after 
consulatation, holding workshops or short courses in specific areas of 
prosecutorial work, e.g., problems of bail; introducing forensic 
evidence ; ethical codes form prosecutors; trying rape cases; trying 
trafficking cases; trying corruption cases; etc.). 
CXI. MODULE 5: CONTROLLING CORRUPTION 
A. Submodule SA: Drafting a new anti-corruption law (to set in place a 
mechanism for reducing the new opportunities for corruption that 
have emerged as Nepalese have become increasingly caught up in 
global commerce: Foreign exchange transactions; contracts with 
multinationals; trafficking in women and drugs; ministry officials' 
unauthonzed increased expenditures on travel abroad; and to make 
reporting of corruption more probable). 
B. Submodule SB: Establishing a mechanism to ensure that, in drafting 
a law to empower a ministry to undertake a program, the drafters 
specify criteria and procedures that make more likely decisions by 
rule, and transparent , accountable, and participatory procedures. 
C. Submodule SC: Training and increasing the numbers of auditors 
available to the Auditor-General's Department. 
D. Submodule SD: Examining and redrafting as necessary the CIAA 
law. 
E. Submodule SE: Training investigators for the CIAA. 
F. Submodule SF: Establishing a SAARC unit on international prices 
and information about international practices that all regional 
government auditors need to know in order to effectively police 
internati onal transactions. 
CXII. MODULE 6: IMPROVING THE CLIMATE FOR INVESTMENT 
A. Submodule 6A: Drafting selected reforms of 'businessmen's laws' 
B. Submodule 6B: Drafting a commercial arbitration law. 
CXIII. MODULE 7: INCREASING EQUITY IN DEVELOPMENT 38 
38 
A. Submodule 7 A: Gender and the law (redrafting selected laws to 
provide better protection for women's rights, e.g. property law; 
research into areas of gender discrimination as necessary) 
B. Submodule 7B: Drafting and institutionalizatio n of a social impact 
statemen t requirement for all new laws and regulations; the impact 
statement to specify the consequences of the proposed new rule on 
women, ~hildren , the poor , minorities and the environment. 
C. Submodule 7C: Decentralization and the law: (A program to increase 
local community members' participation in governance at local levels , 
includin g the formulation and implementation of local legislation 
within the context of the existing national legal framework; and 
where necessary recommending changes in exist ing national laws to 
facilitate more effective local community action s). 
D. Submodule 7D: A program in 'street law' ( or 'know your rights) 
(Preparing and distributing a guide to people's rights when arrested, 
rights of free speech, what a policeman may and may not do, etc.; 
training teachers in the subject ; and introducing a teaching program in 
the subje~t, perhaps in the school system). 
Note: In "eality, existing law as an expression of government ' s policy 
affects every develop, :,ent project. It may either facilitate 0r impede the project 
participants ' progres s ; in turn, every development project inevitably generates 
ideas as to possible changes in the law (and its implementatio n) which might improve 
the enabling envirom r1ent for those the project seeks to empower . The UNDP 
Coordinating Committe ,~ will have made decisions as to whi ch of these or other 
possible modules mig hc best contribute to improving the impact of Nepal ' s legal 
order in shaping the J'.epalese people ' s life opportunities . 
CXIV. MODULE 8: STRENGTHENING PARLIAMENT 
A. Submod ule 8A: Strengthening Parliament's role ·.n the law-making 
and implementing process. (Providing training and facilities for the 
Secretariat, especially more research capacity to provide the MPs and 
their committees with greater information related to up-coming 
legislati ve matters. 
B. Submodule 8B: Strengthening the MPs' role as two way 
communicators to assist their constituents to understand and assess 
specific laws' social impact. 
CXV. MODULE 9: A COMMUNITY LAW-AWARENESS PROGRAM: 
A. Submodule 9A: Introduction of educational programs in the schools 
and media to increase community awareness of how Nepalese 
citizens might participate in ensuring the realization of law's potential 
as an instrument for facilitating development. 
CXVI. MODULE 10: INITIATING A SAARC GOVERNANCE PROGRAM 
A. Submodule 1 OA: To stimulate regional exchange of experiences, and 
lay a basis for developing regional training and research facilities to 
enhance Nepal's and the other participanting countries' efforts to 
strengthen their national legal frameworks, a series of regional 
workshops on ways of strengthening regional judicial systems and 
institutionalizing more open, accountable and paiiicipatory law-
making processes . 
CXVII. MODULE 11: COMPUTERIZATION AND THE LAW 
A. Submodule llA: A review of existing compute r facilities to identify 
the possibilities, and to create an adequate, centralized data base 
available to anyone seeking information about the law; and to provide 
greater training and access by all interested persons. 
III. Target beneficiaries 
a. Target beneficiaries 
CXVIII. Target beneficiaries will include litigants in the courts, who will have 
greater opportunities to enjoy more prompt and equitable justice; businessmen, 
who will find in an improved legal framework a more hospitable investment 
climate; and all Nepalese citizens, who will have access to and will participate in 
more transparent and accountable systems of governance and development. 
b. Direct Recipients: 
CXIX. Direct brecipients will include: 
1. Members of the judicial system, who will receive adequate 
training to perform their jobs promptly and efficiently in the context 
of clearl~1-stated rules that specify criteria and procedures designed to 
ensure fair and equitable justice. 
2. Legislative drafters in the Ministry of Law and Justice, and line 
ministry officials responsible for draft legislatio n who will acquire 
the necessary legislative theory and methodology required to translate 
government policy into effectively implemented legislation. 
3. Line ministry officials responsible for draft legislation, who will 
acquire sufficient legislative drafting techniques ~o participate 
meaningfully in assessing draft legislation and in drafting preliminary 
drafts of bills. 
4. Memb ers of Parliament who will acquire the skills required to 
assess legislation and effectively perform their tasks as two-way 
commun icators between their constituents and the legislature. 
5. Selected faculty members of the University School of Law and the 
Adminis trative Staff College who will receive the training necessary 
to institutionalize an on-going learning-by-doin g legislative drafting 
process to train future drafters in the course of producing bills. 
c. Programme: 
CXX. The programme will involve the following main strategic moves: 
1. The programme will organize the Legal Framework 
Coordinating Committee , which in turn will help interest 
potential donors in the several Modules, especially those 
strengthening the judicial system. Depending on availability of 
funds and the priority accorded them after discussions with the 
Coordinating Committee, UNDP may wish to undertake one or 
more of those Modules itself. 
2. The programme will see to the drafting of bills, including 
legislation to strengthen the judicial system, using the occasion 
to introduce drafters and national ministerial personnel, 
lecturers in law and public administration institutions, and 
members of parliament and Provincial Councilors to legislative 
theory and methodology. 
3. The programme will provide intensive overseas training in 
legislative theory, methodology, social science research 
techniques for drafters, appropriate teaching techniques and, 
on selected topics in foreign law and expe rience to selected 
drafters in the drafting division of the Ministry of Law and 
Justice, selected officials from the several line ministries, and 
one faculty members from the Adfministratgoive Staff Collrege 
and from the Law Faculty. On their retur1-, those trained will 
cooperate with the Administrative Staff College and the Law 
Faculty to institutionalize an in-service lea.ming process for 
drafters in the MLJ and officials in the line ministries in the 
materials they studied in the intensive course, and to institute 
courses in legislative theory , methodologyn and drafting 
techniques inthe College and the Law Faculty. 
A. Project strategy and implementation arrangements. 
1. The project shall be subject to annual evaluation, according to 
a proposed organization , terms of referenc e, and timing 
decided after consultation between the parties to the project 
document plus any associated donor agencies taking part in the 
Coordination Committee. 
2. The Project will be under national administration , with the 
Ministry of Law and Justice assuming executive responsibility. 
The Coordination Commission will serve as advisory 
commission for the project. 
3. The project budget will include $ ____ to finance a final 
evaluation. The provisions for evaluation may not be reduced 
without vvritten agreement by all parties to the project document. 
4. A time schedule of reviews , reports and evaluation is attached 
as Annex II. 
Section C: Development Objective 
CXXI. This Project has the following development objective s: 
A. To strengthen the bill-creating and law-enacting capacity of the 
Nepalese government to design and draft effective, implementable 
transforriiatory laws that , in accordance with the requirements of 
good governance , induce a high degree of accountability , 
transpar ency and popular participation in governmental decision-
making; 
B. to see to the drafting of priority bills and their accompanying research 
reports; .::.nd 
C. to streng then the judicial system's capacity at all levels to overcome 
endemic delays, corruption, and inconsistent dee isions in accord with 
clearly stated rules relating to criteria and procedures. 
SECTION D: IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVES, OUTPUTS AND ACTIVITIES 
1 Immediate Objective 1. 
To establish an advisory committee composed of MLJ and selected 
Nepalese and donor agency representatives to advise MLJ on the Project to 
strengthen Nep al's legal framework. 
1.1 Output 
1. 1. 1 Regular meetings, two or three times a year, to advise MLJ on 
Project. 
1.1.2 Preparation of guidelines for donor assistance to Project. 
1.2 Success criteria 
1.2.1 Regular meetings of advisory committee . 
1.3 Activitie ·s 
1.3.1 Appointment of advisory committee members by May, 1999. 
1.3 .2 Arrangement of meetings, beginning May , 1999. 
1.3 .3 Appointment of committee to prepare guidelines for donor 
assistances , June/July , 1999. 
1.3 .4 Preparation of guidelines 
1.3. 5 Presentation of draft guidelines to Advisrn y Committee, July, 
1999. 
1.4 Responsible party 
1.4.1 MLJ 
1.4.2 MLJ, UNDP 
1.4.3 MLJ, UNDP 
1.4.4 MLJ, UNDP (CT As as advisors) 
1.4.5 MLJ 
2 Immediate Objective 2 
To enhance the intellectual capacity of national and provincial drafters and 
line ministry officials to draft high quality transformatory bills responsive to 
national needs that meet the requirements of good governance, that is, that 
maximize accountabiloity, transparency, and participatwn, and make 
government by rule more likely. 
2.1 Outputs for Objective 2 
2.1.1 In the Ministry of Law and Justice's Drafting Division (MLJ), 
the establishment and institutionalization of an on-going 
in-service learning process to enable its drafters and 
ministerial officials in the course of drafting high-quality 
priority bills to learn legislative theory and 
methodology, and, for ministerial officials, elementary 
legislative drafting techniques, led by five overseas-
trained senior drafters . 
2.1.2 In the University School of Law, the estab]ishment and 
institutionalization of a course in legislative theory and 
methodology, taught by a faculty member with overseas 
training in the subject, to teach students how to design 
legislative programmes; and, on request, to equip MPs 
with knowledge of how to assess bills and the social 
consequences of enacted laws and statutes. 
2.1.3 In the Administrative Staff College, establishment and 
institutionalization of courses in legislative theory and 
methodology of drafting, taught by a faculty member 
with overseas training in these subjects , to teach them to 
potential future ministerial officials and drafters. 
2.2 Success criteria. 
2.2.1 The production of high-quality draft bills, ,research reports and 
social impact statements in the course of the tr4aining 
described. 
2.2.2 Increased capacity of MLJ personnel to draft high quality 
transformatory bills and research reports, as evidenced 
by the quality of the bills and the pe rsuasiveness of the 
research reports. 
2.2.3 Increased capacity of personnel passing through the 
Administrative Staff College to develop legislative 
programmes with a high probabilit J of inducing 
behaviors consonant with developm ent and good 
governance, and to draft laymen's drafts and research 
reports to carry out those program mes. 
2.2.4 Increased capacity of graduatres to devel op legislative 
programmes with a high probability of inducing 
behaviors consonant with developm nt and good 
governance , and to draft laymen's drafts and research 
reports to carry out those programmes. 
2.3 Activitie s 
2.3.1 3 , ,✓eek workshop in Kathmandu, June-July, 1999 
(a; Content: Participants will write first drafts for at least 
five priority bills and research reports, and in the process to 
begin to learn legislative theory and meth odology, and, for line 
ministry officials , elementary legislative drafting techniques; 
and to learn foreign law and experience relevant to drafting 
eat:'h priority bill. The CT As will lead th~ first two weeks of 
the workshop, helpintg participants deve i p skills and 
knowledge in legislative theory, methodology and legislative 
draftiung technqiues, and how to write a competent research 
reporty and social impact statement. In the last week of the 
workshop, specialized consultants in the subject-matter of each 
bill will conduct small seminars consisting of the members of 
that bill's drafting group. 
(b) Leaders: CTAs (first two weeks); specialized consultants 
and CTAs (last week). 
(c) Participants: At least 5 MLJ staff draf ters, 6 to 8 senior 
officials from each of at least five relevam ministries, and 2 
far.:ulty members each from Faculty of Law, University Law 
School and Administrative Staff College. 
(tl) Bills: MLJ to specify four priority hills for workshop. 
(e) Selecting consultants: UNDP will expeditiously adviuse 
the con sultants of the bills for drafting at the workshop. Time 
pe;:mitting, the CT As will forward to UNDP expeditiously thye 
names and cvs of three possible consultan ts for each bill, 
together with the CVT A's recommendations. MLJ in 
consultation with UNDP will make the final selection. 
2.3.1.1 Responsible parties 
(a) MLJ in consultation with the relevant line ministries 
and the UNDP Coordinating Comm r.tee for 
strengthening Nepal's legal framew1;rk, to select priority 
bills related to for the subject-matter of the workshop. 
(b) MLJ to select participants. 
( c) CT As to lead the first workshop. 
2.3 .2 Identification of a four-month overseas training program that 
offers courses in legislative theory and methodology for 
-~ 
designing transformatory law; socia ! science 
methodologies relevant to assessing available evidence 
for justifying proposed bills; and teaching methods to 
enable the participants to prepare materials and establish 
a learning-by-doing process in their respective 
institutions; and specialized tutorial instruction in 
foreign law and experience in the area of specified 
priority Nepalese drafting projects. 
2.3 .2.1 Responsible parties 
MLJ and relevant officials from law school and 
Administrative Staff College to select the overseas 
institution from a list submitted by UNDP. 
2.3.3 5 JVILJ drafting division staff , 1 staff member each from the 
University Law School and the Administrative Staff 
College , and 8 selected line ministr y staff members to 
attend overseas program selected pursuant to 2.3 .1.2. 
Each participant from the MLJ Drafting Division's staff 
and from a line ministry to come prepared to draft a 
priority transformatory law; each participant from the 
teaching institutions to come prepa red to draw up a 
syllabus and teaching materials for courses in legislative 
theory and methodology. Participants to come prepared 
to help write a text in Nepalese for Nepalese students in 
legislative theory and methodolog y and legislative 
drafting techniques. All participants to be bonded to 
remain at their present institutions for not less than 
three years after receiving training. 
2.3.3.1 Responsible parties 
(a) MLJ to select five staff member s to attend overseas 
training institution ; dean of School of Law and Principal 
of the Administrative Staff College to select one member 
of the staff of each to attend that institution; the 
Secretaries of 8 line ministries each to identify one 
senior official who will , on return , r:rovide leadership in 
equipping ministry personnel with the tools required to 
translate policies into effectively ir ,.plemented laws. 
(b) The same officials to assign bills and subjects for the 
participants to develop during their overseas training. 
2.3 .4 Three week workshop, Nepal, June, 2000. 
(a) Content: To write first drafts for at least five priority bills 
and research reports , and in the process to begin to learn 
legislative theory and methodology, and, for line ministry 
officials, elementary legislative drafting techniques; and to 
learn foreign law and experience relevant to drafting each 
pri.ority bill. The returned facilitators will iead the first two 
weeks of mthe workshop , helpintg partici pants develop skills 
and knowledge in legislative theory, methodology and 
legislative draftiung technqiues, and how to write a competent 
research reporty and social impact statement. In the last week 
of the workshop, specialized consultants i11 the subject-matter 
of each bill will conduct small seminars consisting of the 
members of that bill's drafting group . 
(b) Leaders and facilitators : The returned facilitators from the 
overseas training course referred to in 2.3.1.3 (first two weeks); 
consultants selected as per 2.3.l(e) (third vveek). 
(c) Parti cipants: 5 Drafting Division staff drafters , 6 to 8 senior 
officials from each of at least five relevant ministries, and two 
faculty members from the Law School and from the 
Administrative Staff College; two member s of the 
Parliamjentary Secretariat. 
( c) Bills: Drafting Division and Line Mini stries to specify at 
least 5 priority bills for consideration by ·workshop. 
(d) Consultants and advisors: CTAs to s~rve as course 
consultants and evaluators ; consultants sel ,cted as per 2.3 .1 ( e) 
2.J .4.1 Responsible parties 
(a) Drafting Division and line mini stries to select at least 
five priority bills. 
(b) Returned facilitators from overs t>as training course, 
as leaders. 
( c) Drafting Division and relevant ministerial secretaries 
to select participants. 
( d) CT As ( consultants , and as course evaluators). 
( e) CT As to nominate, and MLJ with UNDP to select, 
consultants. 
2.3.5 In July, 2001 repeat activity 2.3.4 for at least five new bills , 
without CTAs as consultants. 
2.3.6 Introduction by Drafting Division of internal procedures to 
ensure transfer of knowledge about legislative theory 
and methodology from facilitators to other MLJ Drafting 
Division staff . 
2.3 .6.1 Responsible partiers 
With CTAs' assistanc , MLJ to develop procedures and 
prepare an internal memorandum concerning them . 
2.3.7 Law Faculty and Administration Staff College 
participants in 4 month overseas program prepare draft 
syllabi for inclusion in the Laqw School curriculum and 
the training of senior publ;ic officials at trhe Staff 
College , together with readings; complete by June, 
2001. 
2.J . 7 .1 Responsible parties 
Staff overseas participants from the two institutions 
2.3.8 Pilot use of workshop syllabi , manual and readings in July , 
2001, 3-week workshop in Nepal as per 2.3.5; revision 
for use in subsequent workshops for Division and line-
ministry drafters. 
2.3.9 :Pi ot use of syllabi, manual and reading s i 1 2001 Law School 
and Administrative Staff College co- rses, and revision 
for use in subsequent courses. 
3 Immediate Objective 3 
In the MLJ , the establishment of institutionalized procedures ensuring 
maximum feasible participation in the bill-creating process, and that, each 
transformatory bill comes accompanied by an adequately researched and 
written research report justifying the bill, and by a social impact statement 
describing the bill's anticipated impact on women, children, the poor, 
minorities, the environment, and good governance. 
3.1 Outputs for Objective 3 
3 .1.1 Institutionalized procedures for the drafting process, supported 
by written regulations, requiring maximum feasible 
public participation in the bill-creacing process, and that 
drafters support bills with research ·r ports justifying 
them, and social impact statements deescribing the bill's 
anticipated consequences for women, children, the poor, 
minorities, the environment and good governance. 
3.2 Success criteria for Objective 3 
3.2.1 Cabinet regularly receives high quality bills and informative 
research reports and social impact statements that 
permit Cabinet intelligently to asse.~s bills submitted to 
Cabinet . 
3.3 Activities for Output 3.1 
3 .3 .1 During 1999 four month overseas program , 2 drafter-
facilitators from Drafting Division will review relevant 
foreign law and experience and prepare first draft of new 
regulations for the legislative drafting process, 
accompanied by a research report, providing for: 
3.3.1.1 
(a) Regular appointment of drafting groups 
including representatives of concerned ministries 
and the MLJ's Drafting Division for each 
transformatory bill; 
(b) opportunity for stakehold ~rs and the public to 
make inputs into the drafting process ; and 
( c) requiring research reports and social impact 
statements in an appropriate, specified form for all 
transformatory bills. 
Responsible parties 
MLJ participants in overseas training program 
3 .3 .2 Review and revision of draft amendments , regulations and 
research report at July , 1999 workshop in Nepal 
3.3.2.1 Responsible parties 
Workshop facilitators ; CT As as co11mltants and advisors 
3.3.3 Submission of draft rules and research report to Cabinet for 
further action . 
3.3.3.1 
MLJ 
4 Immediate Objective 4 
Responsible parties 
Write a Manua l of legislative Drafting Practice in Nep al, to include not only 
details about legislative drafting techniques for drafting bills and pother 
laws, but also for writing competent research reports and social impact 
statements 
4.1 Outputs 
;._ 
4.1.1 A ·legislative drafting manual that includes not only details 
about legislative drafting techniq~es for drafting bills 
and pother laws, but also for writir1g competent research 
reports and social impact statements 
4.2 Success criteria 
4.2.1 A legislative drafting manual as described in 4.1.1. 
4.3 Activitie~ 
4.3 .1 Prepare a legislative drafting manual as prescribed. 
4.3 .1.1 Parties responsible 
Overseas participants from MLJ, as assigned by MLJ. 
5 Immediate Object , ve 5 
Computerization of drafting process and consolidation of all national and 
provincial laws, amendments and subsidiary legislation . 
5.1 Outputs 
5 .1.1 A computerized database of all Nepalese laws, 
subsidiary legislation, regulations, mand other rules 
promulgated by the government, in a form avail;able to 
the general public with computer access. 
5 .1.2 At least one-half of all government lawye1 s and judges 
sufficiently trained in the use of con puters that they can 
access the database. 
5.2 Success criteria 
5.2.l The conmputerized database in existence and available to the 
general public with computer access. 
5.2.2 At least one-half of government lawyers and judges trained to 
access the data base . 
6 
5.3 Activities for Output 1.4 
5.3.1 Identification and appointment of qualifi ed experts to begin 
work immediately to prepare soft ware programme for 
consolidation of all national and provincial legislation. 
5.3.1.1 Responsible parties 
UNDP with consent of MLJ to supply experts (NOTE: 
Not included in the present budget; see Module 11 
, 
above). 
5 .3 .2 Selection of a qualified firm to establish and provide 
equipment for centralized computer system for all 
officials and teaching institutions responsible for 
improving national and provincial capacity to produce 
high quality transformatory legislation. 
5.3.2.1 Responsible parties 
See 5.3.1.1. 
5.3.3 Training for all legal staff of MLJ Drafting Division in use of 
computers for drafting and access to consolidate 
Nepalese legislation and internet. 
5.3.3.1 
MLJ 
Immediate Objective 6 
Responsible parties 
Persuading senjor concerned officials of the desirability of the Project and 
its proposed om:comes, and their participation in its formulation, to the end 
that they 'own' the project. 
6.1 Output 6 .. 1 
At least two brief workshops for senior officials on the project's 
objectiv es, and its theory and methodology 
6.2 Success critreria 
Senior officials have enough familiarity with what the Project aims to 
do wit respect of cooredinating foreign donor aid in this area, 
improving the court system , drafting bills, and the underlying 
drafting theoiry and methodology , that they support the project as 
strongly as possible. 
6.3 Activiti es for Output 6.1 
6.3.1 D·.1ring the period of the July, 1999 work shop, a morning 
workshop followed by luncheon for senior leaders on the 
theory and methodology of the Proj~ct, led by the CTAs 
and the MLJ Drafting Division stafr. 
6.3.2 Ditto, during the period of the June , 2000 workshop. 
6.3 .2.1 Responsible parties 
7 Immediate Objecti-ve 7 
MLJ and UNDP to arrange meetin gs and luncheons; 
national project director and CT As to explain project 
Building capacity in leading members of Parliament. 
7.1 Output 7.1. 
A substantial number of MPs and of the Parliam entary Secretariat 
will have some ability to use legialti8ve mtheor y and methodology to 
help them assess a bill. 
7 .2 Success criteria 
At least 60 MPs with at least two days' training i11 how to assess a 
bill; at Least two members of the Secretariat who have attended a 
three-we ek workshop in these subjects. 
7 .3 Activities tor Output 7 .1. 
7.3.1 D1.~ring July, 1999 visit of CT As, CT As to conduct a two-day 
workshop for 3 0 MPs on how to assess a bill , using as 
examples three priority bills being drafted at the July 
1999 workshop. 
7.J .1.1 Responsible parties 
MLJ with cooperation of Parliamen tary Secretariat to 
organize a two day-workshop; CTAs to coinduct it. 
7.3.2 During July, 2000 , visit of CT As, lecturers from Law School 
and Administrative Staff College to conduct a two day 
workshop for MPs on how to assess a bill, using as 
examples three priority bills selected by the MLJ and 
CT As to serve as consultants and evaluators. 
SECTION E: INPUTS 
Government 
a) Ministry of Law and Justice staff ............ Rps __ lahks 
(b) Training 
Costs of runni eg 3 three week workshops in Nepal 
........................ ......... .......... Rps __ lahks 
Costs of introducing legislative drafting training 
in University School of Law ................. Rps __ lahks 39 
39 I ncluding ,, taff and adm i n i strat i ve personnel sal a ries attributable to 
Costs of introducing legislative drafting courses 
in College of l\1anagemtn ..................... Rps __ lahks 
( c) Land and buildings 
MOLJ Drafting Division ....................... Rps __ lahks 
Workshop training location ................... Rps __ lahks 
University School of Law class rooms, library.Rps __ lahks 
Management c(,llege class rooms, library ....... Rps ___ lahks 
( d) Equipment.. ......... ........................ Rps ___ lahks 
(Equipment now available or to be procured for Projec t use, including 
expendable supplies, operational costs, computers) 
UNDP 
a) Personnel .............. ................................... $129,336 
CT As to conduct two learning-by-doing training workshops for MLJ and 
ministry drafters, and University Law School and Administrative Staff 
College faculty members in Nepal 
legislative theory and methodology; 
available substantive information concerning foreign law and 
experience relevant to priority bills prepared at July '98, March '99 
workshops. 
One foreign consultant for each of five bills for one we,ek of the two three 
week learning-Gy-doing training workshops 40 
course . 
40 This e3 timate includes, for each of ten foreign 
consultants, $3 0CJ,::: for travel; $700 per diem fo .c seven days; and 
(assuming $250 per day f o r five days) $1250 as an honorarium. The 
Mission costs 
b) Training overseas ..................................... $270,000 
Four months overseas training for 5 MLJ Drafting Division officials, 8 
senior line min· stry officials, and 2 faculty members from University Law 
School and Administrative Staff College. 
c) Equipment.. .......... ........................ ..... $190,000 41 
*Centralized computer system 
* Software for consolidation of laws, amendments, and subsidiary legislation 
(Specifications for major equipment items are provide d in Annex IV) 
SECTION F: RISKS 
Potential risks 
1. At the outset of the Project: 
This proposal if completed will bring about some deep-seated 
changes in the judicial system as well as the bill-creating and law-enacting 
procedures in Nepal. Extensive discussions with leading government 
officials and advocates indicate their recognition that that kind of change 
seems necessary to strengthen the judicial system in particular as well as the 
legal order in general. To deepen these officials' understanding of the 
Project, it is proposed during the first three week workshop to invite them to 
advantages of L:c.:..nging foreign experts to th. E:.. workshops would 
include enabling a ll members of the drafting t e ams for each bill 
to learn about relevant foreign law and experience and its 
potential implications for their bill. Th e foreign donor 
finan cing the mod1le which poposed that bill mi gnt pay the costs 
of the relevant c~nsu ltant. Alteratively, the donor might provide 
a consultant at a later period, after further consultations about 
the initial draft. in Nepal. Or the team might rely on relevant 
materials provid ed for Nepal's legal library b 2 the donors and 
through internet. 
41 The Leg a ~- Framework Coordinating Commit :·~ee could 
donor who would f :.nance this essential computeriz~tion. 
seek a 
• 
one or two day workshops to inform them of its aims and progress. 
2. During Project: 
Given the essential role of trained core drafter-facilitator personnel 
and teaching staff in the relevant training institutes, int . oduction of a system 
of bonding for a period of three years for those who go overseas for training 
may help to ensure they will take the essential initial steps in developing on-
going training programs for the relevant ministerial personnel and in the 
Law School and Management College. Beyond that, to retain their 
services, the Project proposes improving all drafters' incentive structures 
and career path s. 
Because leaders change, it is essential that if new leaders take the 
place of those who presently support the Project, these new leaders be as 
soon as possible brought to 'own' the project by explai ning to them its 
objects, purpo" es and underlying methodology and theory. 
SECTION G: PRIOR OBLIGATIONS AND PREREQUISITES 
Prior obligations 
None 
Prerequisites 
The Drafting Dtvision has a long standing tradition and the well-qualified 
personnel required to administer all aspects of the proposed Project. Once 
having their staff trained to teach the new courses, the Law School and 
Administrative Staff College seem well positioned to carry out formal 
instructional functions. 
The MLJ and the relevant teaching institutions have agreed to send the 
requisite qualified personnel for overseas training and, on their return, to 
assign them to ,;onducting regular, on-going workshop'- and courses in 
legislative drafting theory and methodology. 
The relevant rrntional authorities have agreed to cooperate with the MLJ in 
the assignment of well-qualified senior officials to drnfting teams for 
.. .. 
priority transformatory bills. 
The Project Document will be signed by the UNDP, and UNDP assistance 
will be provided only if the prerequisites stipulated above have been or are 
likely to be fulfilled. When anticipated fulfillment of one or more 
prerequisites fails to materialize, the UNDP may, at its discretion, either 
suspend or terminate its assistance. 
SECTION H: PROTI~CT REVIEWS, REPORTING AND EVALUATION 
1. At each stage, the CT As, the MLJ, and the Project participants will 
conduct evaluations of the specific features of the project (ie at the end of 
each set of outputs/activities listed in the Preliminary Workplan; the 2 
workshops in Nepal; and the overseas training, as well as the courses in the 
School of Law and the Managment College.) 
2. The project will be subject to tripartite review Goint review by 
representatives of the Nepali MLJ, the UNDP, and the CT As) at least once 
every 12 months. The first such meeting will take place within the first 12 
months of the start of full implementation. The MLJ shall prepare and 
submit to each tripartite review meeting a Project Performance Evaluation 
Report (PPER). If necessary , additional PPERs may be requested during 
the Project. 
3. A terminal project report will be prepared for consideration at the 
terminal tripartite review meeting. It shall be prepared · n draft at least four 
months prior tc, the terminal tripartite review to allow review and technical 
clearance by the MLJ. 
(Who prepares this? Should this proposal include recommendation 
for an outside evaluation mission, with costs included in the Project 
b d tr,') ??????????? ( 13 5 f 'H t W 't P . t u ge . i ; • • • • • • • • • • • see p. o ow o . 1 e a roJec 
Document') 
SECTION I: LEGAL CONTRACT (seep. 137 for form which depends on 
whether or not the go vernment has signed UNDP Standard Basic Assistance 
Agreement) 
SECTION J: BUDGETS 
BUDGET FOR PROPOSED NATIONAL LEGAL FRAMl ~WORK PROJECT 
Country: Nepal 
Project Number: 
Project Title: National Legal Framework 
Project Budget Covering UNDP Contribt iition 
(in U.S. dollars) 
Description Total 1999 2000 2001 
Project 
personnel 
CTAs 42 29 ,000 
Consultants/ 
bill 19,500 9,750 
Sub-component 
Total 42,000 
Travel 43 60.000 
11,250 11,250 7,500 
9,750 
17,250 
25,000 
17,250 
25,000 
7,500 
10,000 
Mission costs 10,836 3,612 3,612 3,612 
Component 
Total 129,336 49,112 49,112 21,112 
15 Training 
Fellowships 270,000 
Component 
Total11 270,000 
270,000 
270,000 
4 2 CTAs = 1. 5 m/ m per year (includes supervision of training 
overseas and thr ee weeks each ye ar in Nepal, conducting workshops 
and eva luating in s tituti onalization o f project). 
43 Estimated cost of r ound-trip, Boston-Nepa \ business class, 
$5,000 f o r eac h CTA. 
44 Tuition, board and room estimated at $16,000; travel at 
$2,000, totalling $ 18 ,000 / f e llowship. 
Equipment 
Non-expend-
able equip 190,000 
Component 
Total 190,000 
Miscellaneous 24,000 
Component 
Total 24,000 
Grand Total 603,33612. 
190,000 
190,000 
8,000 
8,000 
517,112 57,112 
8,000 8,000 
8,000 8,000 
Project budget covering Government contribution 
(in lahks of Rupees) 
4 5 Of this t o tal, foreign consul tan ts for e a ch of five bills 
at two workshops account for $49,500, and computerization 
accountsfor $190 , 000. If the UNDP can find other donors to 
provide funds for these purposes, these costs to the UNDP might be 
reduced or elimin a ted. 
